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1 Introduction
Intrusion tolerance [8] is an approach to handling malicious attacks, in which the impracticability of 
making a system fully secure against all attacks is recognized and intrusions are expected, but the system is 
designed to provide proper service in spite of them (possibly in a degraded mode). Intrusion tolerance has the 
potential to become a very useful approach in building server architectures that withstand attacks. Several 
such intrusion-tolerant server architectures have been conceived in both academia and industry, including 
KARMA [9], ITSI [16], ITUA [4], and PBFT [3]. However, there has not been any comparative study of 
their performance and dependability. There are many challenges in doing such a study. First, it is difficult to 
identify representative architectures that cover the various design possibilities for building intrusion-tolerant 
architectures. Second, the problem of coming up with detailed yet reasonably high-level models of chosen 
representative architectures that could be comprehensively evaluated is a fairly complex one. The models 
should represent the design differences between architectures without getting tied down to low-level details. 
Third, coming up with appropriate measures that bring out the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
representative architectures is a complex problem in itself.
In this paper, the above challenges are addressed for the first time (to the best of our knowledge), and 
a fairly comprehensive comparison of intrusion-tolerant server architectures is presented. We realize that 
given the many variations in implementing intrusion-tolerant systems, any comparative study is feasible only 
if we identify classes of intrusion-tolerant architectures, and limit our comparison to abstract architectures 
that are representative of these classes. In this work, we identify four classes of intrusion-tolerant server 
architectures based on how requests are handled and how decisions are made in response to intrusions. In 
modeling the effectiveness of these classes of intrusion-tolerant architectures, we realize that the perfor­
mance and dependability of these intrusion-tolerant systems cannot be quantified in a deterministic manner, 
because the systems do not provide complete immunity to all possible intrusion methods. An attractive 
option for evaluating intrusion-tolerant systems is via probabilistic modeling [13], as shown by Singh et al. 
[17], who validated an intrusion-tolerant replication system, with variations in internal algorithms, using 
probabilistic models.
In this paper, we evaluate and compare the strengths and weaknesses of the four architectures in proba­
bilistic terms. We use Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) [11, 14] as our representation of the models for 
the architectures. By varying the parameters of the models, we obtain information about performance and 
intrusion tolerance characteristics of the different architectures. Some of the input parameters include intru­
sion detection rate, repair rate of corrupted servers, single-phase and multi-phase attack rate and probability, 
and firewall filter rate. We define various measures on the system that characterize system performance 
and intrusion tolerance. They include “strong” and “weak” unavailability1 of the system, productive and 
unproductive throughput1, and fraction o f online servers that are corrupted1.
'We explain these terms in Section 4.
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2 Intrusion-Tolerant Server Architectures
We consider intrusion-tolerant architectures that follow a client-service system paradigm (for example, 
a web browser as a client and a collection of web servers as the service system). All such systems are 
based on replication of information across a set of servers, and rely on a distributed architecture that routes 
incoming requests among several server nodes in a user-transparent way. By replicating the servers of the 
service system, we could potentially improve throughput performance and provide server systems with high 
availability and scalability. All such systems also have some mechanism by which the incoming requests are 
spread among the servers. The reader is referred to [2] for a detailed classification of the various approaches 
for routing the requests among the distributed server nodes.
Since transparency is a design criterion in all the architectures, we consider only those mechanisms for 
routing the requests among the server nodes that do not require the clients to know that there are repli­
cated servers in the service system and that do not divulge any information about which of the replicated 
servers actually service a particular client’s request. This “hiding” of the servers from clients is necessary for 
anonymity and security purposes. For instance, if an attacker identifies the specific operating system of a tar­
get platform, he/she can focus an attack, minimizing time and attack signatures. Client-based, DNS-based, 
and server-based routing mechanisms (see [2]) do not satisfy the requirement of “hiding.” The appropriate 
routing mechanism is the dispatcher-based approach, in which a single virtual IP address is used for the en­
tire service system. The dispatching mechanism could be centralized, in which case it would route requests 
to individual servers, or it could be logically distributed among the servers, in which case the requests would 
be multicast to the servers.
We explored the design space for intrusion-tolerant systems that satisfy the above criteria, and identified 
the following dimensions along which architectures can vary: (1) how the client requests get routed to the 
servers, (2) whether the decisions to reconfigure the system in response to intrusions are made centrally 
or in a distributed manner, and (3) whether multiple requests are served concurrently by different servers. 
Based on the above, we partitioned the design space into four classes. In this paper, we model four abstract 
architectures, each of which is representative of one of those classes. They are
• Centralized Routing Centralized Management (CRCM),
• Multicast Routing Centralized Management (MRCM),
• State Machine Replication (SMR), and
• Multicast Routing Decentralized Management (MRDM).
All four intrusion-tolerant distributed web server architectures that we evaluate have the following compo­
nents in one form or another:
1. Client: The client is a program, like a web browser, that establishes connections to the service system 
in order to satisfy user requests.
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2. Service: This component implements the protocols to service an incoming client request. For exam­
ple, it could be an HTTP server.
3. Intrusion Detector: This component could be a combination of multiple third-party intrusion detection 
tools and protocol-specific intrusion detection (in which violations of the protocol specification are 
treated as intrusions).
4. Configuration Manager Daemon: The Configuration Manager Daemon (or CMDaemon for short) 
uses the Intrusion Detector component to keep track of whether or not the service has been compro­
mised, and implements strategies for recovering from attacks. There is one CMDaemon component 
for each Service component. Each CMDaemon monitors one Service component and may run in the 
same host as that Service component.
5. Configuration Manager: The Configuration Manager receives reports from the CMDaemons about the 
well-being of the Service Components that they monitor. It decides how to recover when an intrusion 
is reported, and instructs the CMDaemons about this decision. Each CMDaemon then implements 
those instructions in their respective Service components.
6. Gateway: This is the component whose IP address is known to the clients as the IP address of the 
service system. It serves as the dispatcher that controls the routing of the client requests to the Service 
components, helping to mask the identities of the Service components’ operating systems and the 
service application. In architectures that do not have the Gateway component, all the servers receive 
all the client requests. That is done in various ways; for example, all the servers could be configured 
to be members of an IP multicast group. Clients would send their requests to this multicast address.
7. Firewall: This component filters incoming requests based on certain policies.
8. Database: The Database component is the store for the information that clients want to access. In 
this paper, we are not concerned about the exact organization of this component. A comparison of the 
performance benefits of various client-server database architectures is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Interested readers are referred to [1, 6, 7].
The four architectures differ in how the above components interact with each other, their placement, and 
which of them are trusted. A “trusted” component is one that is assumed not to fail. We now describe each 
of the architectures we are considering in more detail.
2.1 Centralized Routing Centralized Management (CRCM)
The goal of the CRCM design is to employ a small number of trusted components to protect a large set 
of servers and databases. In this design, a Firewall component filters the incoming requests, looking for 
signatures of commonly known attacks. The Gateway is a trusted component. An incoming request passes
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(a) Centralized Routing Centralized Management (b) Multicast Routing Centralized Management
HO ST 1 HOST 1
(c) State Machine Replication (d) Multicast Routing Decentralized Management
Figure 1: Architecture Block Diagrams
through the Firewall to reach the Gateway, which then forwards the request to a randomly chosen server 
from the active server set. The Gateway also masks server-specific and OS-specific information from all 
the replies. The service system consists of a large collection of servers. They share the same filesystem, 
but might run different operating systems and different web-server software versions. In addition to the 
server software, each host that is part of the service system also runs a CMDaemon, which is responsible 
for detecting attacks via various mechanisms (e.g., integrity-checking of various critical files and checking 
of the process states). The CMDaemons report the health of the local server to the Configuration Manager, 
which is a trusted component. The Manager continually checks the integrity of the CMDaemons. If there 
is an intrusion detection, the Manager cleans the server state, and could roll back the potentially erroneous 
transactions committed by the intruded server. The Manager informs the Gateway about the current active 
server set. The Gateway uses that information in the selection of servers to process client requests.
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2.2 Multicast Routing Centralized Management (MRCM)
In the MRCM architecture, intrusion tolerance is obtained through hardened, heterogeneous platforms. 
We achieve this hardening by embedding firewalls in each server host, and having extensive alert and 
intrusion-detection capabilities in each server host. Those capabilities form the CMDaemon component. 
There are no additional front-end firewalls like those in CRCM. Scalability is achieved through the ability 
to add additional platforms easily, and maintainability is achieved through the ability to remove and service 
platforms easily. All the servers receive all the requests sent to the single virtual IP address of the service. 
The service rules on each server determine what traffic to process and what to throw away. For example, 
rules could be based on the source IP address of the client, in which case, if there are two web servers, the 
rule might be that server 1 processes a request if the last digit of the client IP address is from 0-4, and that 
otherwise server 2 processes the request. In essence, those service rules form a load-balancing policy. The 
load-balancing policy could be changed at the behest of the Configuration Manager (for example, when an 
intrusion is detected and the intruded host shut down), and the clients previously serviced by the intruded 
host would need to be distributed among the correct hosts. When an intrusion is detected, the Configuration 
Manager could instruct the servers to implement the new load-balancing policy by giving them an updated 
set of service rules. Through the CMDaemon on a host, the Configuration Manager could also update the 
filtering policies on the host-embedded firewalls so that traffic from specified clients is blocked or audited.
2.3 State Machine Replication (SMR)
The SMR design employs a state-machine-replication-based approach [15] that tolerates malicious faults. 
A replication protocol that tolerates Byzantine faults, similar to the one described in [3], could be used (with 
some modifications to ensure user transparency) for this architecture. The requirement for an algorithm 
tolerating Byzantine faults is that it must have at least 3 /  +  1 servers, where /  is the number of simultaneous 
faults that need to be tolerated. SMR does not require an extensive firewall like those in the CRCM and 
MRCM architectures. Unlike CRCM and MRCM, there is no centralized trusted Configuration Manager 
and local CMDaemons. Instead, the Configuration Management is now distributed among the servers. The 
distributed Configuration Management and Service components are integrated into one logical unit. This 
integrated Management and Service unit is replicated across the set of servers, and the Byzantine-fault- 
tolerant protocol ensures that all correct servers maintain consistent state information for this integrated 
unit. As in MRCM, all requests reach all the servers. The set of servers processes one request at a time. 
The servers agree on the reply to be sent to the client, as well as on any updates to be made to the back-end 
database, through a Byzantine agreement protocol. SMR ensures that all replies sent to clients and updates 
made to the database are correct, as long as there are no more than /  simultaneous corruptions in the system 
(we call this the Byzantine agreement requirement), but involves a large performance overhead due to the 
fact that all the requests are serialized and processed by the entire set of servers one at a time.
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2.4 Multicast Routing Decentralized Management (MRDM)
The MRDM design is a hybrid of the previous 3 architectures, and tries to achieve a tradeoff between 
the better throughput performance achieved by the parallelism of the CRCM and MRCM architectures, and 
the strict correctness achieved by the SMR architecture, without relying on any tmsted components. It does 
so by separating the service component in the SMR architecture from the configuration management. As 
in the SMR architecture, the Configuration Manager is distributed across the host nodes. However, unlike 
in SMR, the server nodes do not all process the same request at the same time. A firewall component 
embedded in each host (similar to the one in MRCM) could be used to filter out incoming requests based 
on specified policies. The incoming request is randomly routed to one of the servers (like in CRCM). Each 
host runs a server component and a configuration management component (which represents an integrated 
Configuration Manager, CMDaemon, and Intrusion Detector component). The servers can process requests 
independently from each other (unlike in SMR), but the configuration management components across all 
the hosts coordinate with each other, distribute knowledge about intrusions, and come to agreement about 
the configuration changes that need to be made in response to intrusions. At the core of the configuration 
management component could be an intrusion-tolerant group membership protocol (such as the one in [12]) 
that requires the participation of at least 3 /  +  1 nodes to tolerate /  simultaneous intrusions. By separating 
the service component from the management component, we are able to retain the parallelism of the CRCM 
and MRCM architectures, and by distributing the management component, we remove the need for having a 
central tmsted Configuration Manager. However, MRDM does not guarantee the same level of correctness 
as SMR, since the intmded node could still be servicing some requests, and potentially sending erroneous 
replies, during the time period between the intrusion of a node and the detection of the intmsion. Hence, 
this architecture does not guarantee strict correctness of replies. The SMR architecture, on the other hand, 
masks the effects of a subset of intmded servers, as long as the threshold requirement of /  is satisfied.
2.5 Assumptions and Attack Model
We assume staged attacks, which means that there is a non-negligible time between successive node 
infiltrations. That gives the defense some time to react. None of the above architectures can defend against 
a situation in which all the hosts are simultaneously intmded. They also cannot defend against a situation 
in which the attacker intmdes the various nodes in stages, but the compromised nodes show no observable 
signs of an intmsion until all the nodes have been intmded (this is essentially the same as the first situation). 
For the staged attack assumption to be tme, node failures must not be strongly correlated. That could be 
achieved, for instance, by running different implementations of the service code and/or the operating system.
Within the staged attack model, there could be two kinds of attacks on a single host: multi-phase attacks 
that require a sequence of attacks in order to successfully compromise the host (for example, an attacker 
could upload a file line-by-line using the Windows “echo” command), and single-phase attacks that suc­
cessfully compromise the host in one shot (for example, the attacker could guess the correct password and
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Feature CRCM MRCM SMR MRDM
Parallelism in processing requests Yes Yes No Yes
Strict correctness of replies guaranteed No No Yes No
Configuration Manager Centralized Centralized Distributed Distributed
Required number of servers for 
uninterrupted service when /  
servers are compromised
/+1 /+1 3 /  +  1 3 /  +  1
Forwarding of client request by 
Gateway
to a
randomly
selected
server
to all servers to all servers to a
randomly
selected
server
Servicing of request by the 
randomly 
selected 
server
based on 
source IP
by all servers by the 
randomly 
selected 
server
Trusted components 2 1 0 0
Table 1: Summary of the design features of the four architectures
gain root access on the first attempt).
The CRCM and MRDM architectures employ dispersion, i.e., because of the random selection of servers 
by the Gateway, requests from the same client could be processed by different servers. That decreases the 
probability that different phases of a multi-phase attack will reach the same server. That, in turn, increases 
the time required to exploit any single web server using multi-phase attacks.
3 SAN Models for Intrusion-Tolerant Server Architectures
3.1 Stochastic Activity Networks
As stated in the introduction, we use SANs, a stochastic extension of Petri nets, as our model represen­
tation. Here we present only a brief overview of SANs. Interested readers are urged to consult [11, 14] for 
additional details on SANs.
Stochastic Activity Networks, or SANs, are a convenient, graphical, high-level language for capturing 
the stochastic (or random) behavior of a system. A SAN has the following components: places (denoted 
by circles), which contain tokens (the term “marking” is used to indicate the number of tokens in a place) 
and are like variables; tokens, which indicate the “value” or “state” of a place; activities (denoted by vertical 
ovals), which change the number of tokens in places; input arcs, which connect places to transitions; output 
arcs, which connect transitions to places; input gates (denoted by triangles pointing left), which are used to
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define complex enabling predicates and completion functions; output gates (denoted by triangles pointing 
to the right), which are used to define complex completion functions; cases (denoted by small circles on 
activities), which are used to specify probabilistic choices; and instantaneous activities (denoted by vertical 
lines), which are used to specify zero-timed events. An activity is enabled if for every connected input 
gate, the enabling predicate contained in it is true, and for each input arc, there is at least one token in the 
connected place. Each case has a probability associated with it and represents a probabilistic choice of the 
action to take when an activity completes. When an activity completes, one token is added to each place 
connected by an output arc, and functions contained in connected output gates and input gates are executed. 
The output gate and input gate functions are usually expressed using pseudo-C code. The times between 
enabling and firing of activities can be distributed according to a variety of probability distributions, and the 
parameters of the distribution can be a function of the state.
3.2 Description of Models
We have modeled the four architectures described in Section 2 as composed stochastic activity networks. 
Atomic models were built for various components of each architecture, and complete models were then built 
using replicate and join operations. Replicated and joined sub-models in a composed model can interact with 
each other through a set of places (called shared places) that are common to multiple sub-models.
The salient features that we have tried to model for each architecture include generation of client requests 
and attacks, organization of firewalls and filtering of requests, organization of servers and distribution of 
requests to servers, servicing of requests and effect of attacks, detection mechanisms, system reconfiguration 
upon detection of corruption, and repair of affected components.
We have used exponential distribution for the timed activities in all the models. We believe this is a 
realistic assumption, because the request arrival process and servicing of requests by servers (especially 
web servers) are largely memoryless, and hence are well-represented by exponential inter-arrival times and 
exponential service times. Single-phase attacks and the subsequent phases in a given multi-phase attack are 
generated with some probability on the incoming requests; hence, they also have an exponential distribution 
in our SAN models. We developed that approach in order to keep the attack model fairly simple; we focused 
the complexity in the models to reveal the differences among various architectures. We understand that we 
may need sophisticated attack models in order to model the intrusion response behavior of the architectures 
more accurately. That may be the focus of another study.
We now provide a description of the models of the individual architectures.
3.2.1 Centralized Routing Centralized Management (CRCM)
Figure 2(a) shows the composed model for CRCM described in Section 2.1. The model consists of 
four atomic SAN submodels: Client, Server, ConfigManager, and FirewallGw. The Server submodel is 
replicated N um S ervers  times, where N um S ervers is a global variable indicating the number of hosts
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Figure 2: SAN Models for CRCM
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running servers.
Figure 2(b) shows the SAN representation of the Client submodel. This SAN models the generation 
of incoming requests to the system from the clients. Since requests have to pass through a firewall and a 
gateway before they are distributed to individual servers, we have a single unreplicated client submodel in 
the composed model. The place Requests is shared with the Firewall submodel, and its marking represents 
the number of new requests waiting to pass through the firewall. The activity GenerateReqs is responsible 
for generating new requests. The input gate MaxReqs allows the activity to be enabled only if the number 
of waiting requests is lesser than an upper bound, MaxRe q u e s t s .  We bound lengths of all places in our 
model that serve as queues between components so that the model has a finite number of states.
Figure 2(c) shows the SAN representation of the FirewallGw submodel. This SAN models the firewall 
that filters incoming requests with known attack signatures. The place Requests is shared with the Client 
submodel, and keeps track of the number of requests waiting to be processed. Upon firing, the activity 
FilterRequests consumes a token from Requests, and, according to the probability distribution of its three 
cases, designates the request to be a good request, a single-phase attack, or a multi-phase attack (the number 
of phases in a multi-phase attack is set in the Server submodels). A case corresponding to an attack is 
chosen with the probability that such an attack will occur and will escape the firewall. The output places are 
shared with the Server submodels. A point to note here is that since all packets pass through the firewall to 
reach the servers, we model general attacks, including the ones that are not malformed client requests, as a 
part of the request stream. That is acceptable, since the request stream models the path all attacks follow, and 
since effects of both single-phase and multi-phase attacks are similar (they result in corruption of a server).
Figure 2(d) shows the SAN representation of a Server submodel. This SAN models the distribution of 
client requests to individual servers, servicing of requests, corruption of servers due to attacks, dispersion of 
multi-phase attacks, and detection of corruption and the system’s response to it.
As described in Section 2.1, the centralized load-balancing gateway randomly forwards each incoming 
request to the system to one of the active servers. The activity LoadBalancing is present in each Server sub­
model to model this distribution. The places representing local queues are introduced to accurately model 
the distribution scheme, which is different from an idealized scheme in which a server picks a request from 
the global pool as soon as it becomes idle. If the case corresponding to a multi-phase attack is chosen, Lo- 
calMultiPhase is set to a random integer between 2 and M axPhases (a tunable global variable representing 
the maximum number of phases in a multi-phase attack), and PhasesNeeded, which represents the number 
of phases that need to be successful for the multi-phase attack to be successful, is set to a fixed fraction of 
LocalMultiPhase.
The activity Service represents the servicing of requests in the server’s local queue, as well as the effect 
of attacks on the server. The local place Corruption keeps track of the level of corruption of this server. 
A marking of 0 implies no corruption at all, and a marking of M axP hases implies complete corruption, 
which is sufficient to influence the server’s behavior. A value in between indicates that some phases of a 
multi-phase attack have been successful, but that the system is not corrupt enough to behave incorrectly.
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We model dispersion by having the probability of success of a phase in a multi-phase attack be the recip­
rocal of the marking of NumActive, a shared place that keeps track of the number of servers online. That 
accurately models the fact that each phase randomly goes to any of the active servers. If the number of 
phases represented by the marking of PhasesNeeded are successful on this server, the value of Corruption 
is set to M axPhases, indicating the successful completion of the multi-phase attack. On the other hand, if 
the required number of phases have not completed when the last token is removed from LocalMultiPha.se, 
the attack is deemed to be unsuccessful, and the marking of Corruption is reset to 0. The marking of the 
shared place NumCorrupt (which represents the number of corrupt but as-yet-undetected online servers in 
the system) is incremented upon completion of a successful attack on the server.
The activity Detection represents the detection component present on the server host. If the case corre­
sponding to a successful detection is chosen, the output gate ResetState is responsible for sending the alert 
information to the Configuration Manager. Upon receipt of a response from the Manager, the server is taken 
offline (through setting of the marking of local place Offline to 1), thus reducing the number of active servers 
(represented by the shared place NumActive), decrementing the number of corrupt servers if the server rep­
resented by this SAN was completely corrupt at the time of detection, and purging all the requests currently 
in the server’s local queues. A point to note is that Detection is enabled if the marking of Corruption is non­
zero, and the probability of successful detection is proportional to the number of changes that have been 
made to the configuration of the server (represented by the number of successful attack phases, which is 
equal to the marking of Corruption). Because of model size and complexity, we do not model false alarms. 
However, that does not constitute a shortcoming of our models, given that our focus in the models is on the 
effect of intrusion reports. Hence, we model a composite of actual attacks and false alarms (or, equivalently, 
correct and false intrusion reports).
Once a server is taken offline, the Configuration Manager informs the load-balancing gateway about this 
change, and the latter no longer forwards new requests to the server. We model that by enabling the activity 
LoadBalancing only when the marking of Offline is 0.
The activity Repair represents the process of reinitializing the state of the server. Upon firing, it incre­
ments the number of active servers in the system, and sets the marking of Offline to 0, allowing the server to 
receive requests again.
3.2.2 Multicast Routing Centralized Management (MRCM)
Figure 3.2.2 shows the composed model for MRCM, which was described in Section 2.2. It consists 
of three atomic SAN models: Server, Firewall, and ConfigManager. Since a firewall is now present on 
each host running the server, the submodels are joined to form a model of each host (Joinl). The resulting 
submodel is replicated N um S ervers times to form a model of the set of servers.
Figure 3.2.2 shows the SAN representation of the Firewall submodel. This SAN models the generation 
of requests from the client, distribution of requests to the servers, filtering of requests as they pass through 
the firewall, and generation of multiple phases of a multi-phase attack. As described in Section 2.2, in this
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architecture, each request goes to all the servers, and exactly one of them picks it up (using a deterministic 
function) for service, while the other servers discard it. We model this by generating requests for each server 
separately, not through centralized request generation as we did for CRCM. To optimize the model’s state- 
space, we do not model the request generation in a separate client model, since the client submodel would 
have to be replicated with each server. We model the redistribution of requests when a server goes offline 
by setting the rate of FilterRequests to be weighted by the fraction of the total number of servers that are 
currently active.
The SAN representation for the Server submodel is similar to the SAN for the Server submodel of 
CRCM described above. The significant differences are as follows. There are no global request queues 
(since requests are generated for each server); the queues are simply shared with the Firewall submodel. 
Since there is no dispersion in this architecture, if the case corresponding to multi-phase attack is chosen in 
ServeReq, the phase is always successful, resulting in an increase in the marking of Corruption.
The SAN representation for the ConfigManager submodel is identical to the SAN for the ConfigMan- 
ager submodel of CRCM.
3.2.3 State Machine Replication (SMR)
Figure 4(a) shows the composed model for SMR, which was described in Section 2.3. The model consists 
of four atomic SAN submodels: Client, Server, Synchronizer, and Repair. The Server submodel is 
replicated N um S ervers  times to form the set of Servers.
Figure 4(b) shows the SAN representation of the Client submodel. This SAN models the generation of 
incoming requests to the system. Since each request is sent to all the active servers, we have centralized 
request generation, and upon firing of the activity GenerateReqs, the marking of the shared place Requests 
is increased by the marking of NumActive (i.e., we send a copy of the request to each active server).
Figure 4(c) shows the SAN representation of the Server submodel. This SAN models the processing of 
client requests by a server, attacks on a server, performance of Byzantine agreement between servers before a
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reply is sent back to the client, exhibition of incorrect behavior by corrupt servers, the subsequent exclusion 
of corrupt servers from the server group (provided there are enough uncorrupted servers for agreement), 
restarting of new servers on standby hosts, and repair of excluded hosts.
The activity Attack represents the attacks on the server. Since the system reacts identically to single- and 
multi-phase attacks (since each request is sent to all servers), we have modeled both by a single activity. 
Also, since each server has a publicly visible IP address and there is no firewall, we have modeled the attack 
generation explicitly, instead of having it be a part of the request stream. On firing, the marking of the local 
place Corruption is set to 1, and the marking of the shared place NumCorrupt is incremented.
The activity Service represents the processing of a client request by the server, and the reaching of Byzan­
tine agreement among the servers on the reply. The probability distribution of the two cases is governed by 
the marking of the local place Corruption. If the marking of Corruption is 0, the case corresponding to the 
output gate SimpleReply is chosen with a probability of 1. SimpleReply models the sending of a correct reply
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by the server. It increments the marking of Replies, and puts a token in the shared place SyncInProgress 
if its marking was 0. Hence, the first active server that starts processing of a particular request puts a 1 in 
SyncInProgress. SimpleReply also sets the marking of the local place SentReply to 1. The activity Service 
is enabled only if SentReply has no tokens. If the marking of Corruption is 1, the probability of the case 
corresponding to the output gate ConvictReply is p ro b M is b e h a v io r ,  a global variable that represents 
the probability that a corrupt replica will exhibit corrupt behavior during the agreement process. Convic­
tReply first checks if there are enough uncorrupted hosts to reach a Byzantine agreement, i.e., the marking 
of NumCorrupt is less than a third of the marking of NumActive. If a Byzantine agreement can be reached, 
the marking of the local place Shutdown is set to 1 (indicating that this server has been taken offline), the 
markings of NumActive and NumCorrupt are decremented, and the marking of Corruption is reset to 0. 
We also increment the marking of the shared place HostsToRepair, since the host on which the server was 
running is also excluded, and we need to repair this host and bring it back into the system.
The activity StartupServer represents the starting of a new server on a standby host, to replace one that 
has been shut down. This activity is enabled if the server represented by this SAN has been shut down, 
and there is at least one standby host. When StartupServer fires, the marking of Shutdown is set to 0, and 
the marking of the shared place IdleHosts is decremented. We include standby hosts for SMR, because 
Byzantine agreement among hosts is the only way of detecting corruption, and it is necessary to have the 
corrupt server replaced quickly (by a server running on a standby host) to maintain the same level of intrusion 
tolerance.
The instantaneous activity Ready is enabled if the server has sent a reply (a token is present in SentReply) 
and the marking of SyncInProgress is 0. This implies that all active servers have sent their replies, and hence 
a reply has been sent to the client, and the servers are ready to process a new request. When Ready fires, the 
marking of SentReply is reset to 0. That achieves a kind of “barrier synchronization,” so that all servers start 
on a new request only after all of them have completed the processing of the previous request. This models 
the requirement of maintaining consistent state across all correct replicas.
Figure 4(d) shows the SAN representation of the Synchronizer submodel. This SAN models the com­
pletion of the response to a client request. The activity Agreement is enabled if the markings of Replies 
and NumActive are identical, i.e., each online server has sent a reply to the current request. The delay at 
this activity increases with the number of servers in the system. However, instead of increasing linearly, it 
increases as a step function, with jumps whenever the number of servers is of the form 3 /  +  1 (i.e., it jumps 
at 4, 7, 10, and so on). When Agreement fires, it resets the markings of Replies and SyncInProgress to 0 so 
that all of the servers can work on the next request. The Synchronizer submodel is needed since the servers 
have to maintain the same state, because they use state-machine replication; therefore, a server cannot start 
working on a new request before the current request has been completely handled.
Figure 4(e) shows the SAN representation of the Repair submodel. This SAN models the repair process 
of the excluded hosts, which results in their transition to the standby state.
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3.2.4 Multicast Routing Decentralized Management (MRDM)
The composed model and atomic SAN submodels for the MRDM architecture are shown in Figure 5. 
They are quite similar to those for MRCM (Section 3.2.2). The major differences are as follows. The 
composed model for MRDM does not have a ConfigManager submodel, since the management decision 
is taken in a decentralized manner using the Byzantine agreement algorithm; in the Server submodel for 
MRDM, upon detection, a corrupt server is taken offline only if the other servers can reach a Byzantine 
agreement on shutting it down. Since multi-phase attacks are dispersed in MRDM, the probability of success 
of an attack phase in the Server submodel varies inversely with the number of active servers.
4 Results
We used the Möbius [5] tool to build the SANs, define performance and intrusion tolerance measures, 
and design studies on the models. We also used Möbius to simulate the models and obtain values for the 
measures defined on various studies. We defined several measures on each model for use in the studies. 
They included:
• productive throughput: This measure characterizes the number of requests that the system replies to 
correctly per time unit. We assume that all correct servers reply correctly to the requests they serve,
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and all corrupt servers reply incorrectly to the requests they receive. We study the expected value of 
this measure averaged over a time interval.
•  unproductive throughput: This measure characterizes the number of requests that the system replied 
to incorrectly per time unit.
• strong unavailability for an interval: This measure characterizes the fraction of time the service was 
improper in the given time interval. For this measure, the service was defined to be improper (for the 
CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM architectures) if at least one active server was in a corrupt, undetected 
state, or all servers were offline for repair. For SMR, the service is improper if more than a third of 
the active servers are corrupt. Hence, a strongly available system does not send an incorrect reply to 
any request.
• weak unavailability for an interval: This measure also characterizes the fraction of time the service 
was improper in the given time interval, but it uses a weaker definition of proper service. The service 
is proper if at least one correct server is online. This measure is not defined on models for SMR. The 
above two unavailability measures characterize the survivability of the systems as perceived by a user.
• fraction o f corrupt servers: This measure characterizes the fraction of active servers that are corrupt 
at a given instant of time.
We designed several studies on the models to determine how various architectures behave when we vary 
some important system parameters, and to determine the range of parameter values for which a particular 
architecture is superior over others, with respect to intrusion tolerance and performance characteristics. The 
input parameters we varied are the number of hosts in the system, the rate of single-phase attacks on the 
system, the rate of multi-phase attacks on the system, the quality of the detection mechanism being used, 
and the rate at which components taken offline are repaired and brought back into the system.
Unless otherwise specified, we used the values given below for various input parameters. We need to 
emphasize here that the reader need not be particularly concerned about our specific choice of parameter 
values, because the aim of these experiments is to present performance and dependability trends/patterns of 
these architectures relative to each other, rather than exact values. It is very hard (if not impossible) to come 
up with any single universally applicable choice of values, because these architectures could be deployed in 
widely varying situations. However, using our SAN models, we can quite easily conduct these experiments 
for a large range of parameter values.
We consider a time unit of one minute. Request arrival rate was set to 100 requests (to the entire service 
system) per minute for all the architectures. Cumulative attack rates were set to be 12 and 6 per hour for 
single and multi-phase attacks respectively.
The local detection components running on each server check for corruption once every two minutes for 
CRCM, and once every minute for MRCM and MRDM. That is justified because CRCM uses a centralized
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detection mechanism with lightweight daemons running on individual hosts, resulting in slower detection, 
whereas all the detection in MRCM and MRDM is done locally on each host, resulting in faster detection. 
The probability of detecting a corruption in each run is set to 0.5. Likewise, in SMR, a corrupt server 
misbehaves with a probability of 0.5. (In Section 4.1, we explain why the probability of misbehavior in 
SMR is equivalent to the probability of detection in other architectures.)
The probability that the centralized firewall in CRCM will detect and filter out an attack in CRCM was 
set to 0.75. The probability that the local firewalls on each host running a service component in MRCM and 
MRDM will detect and filter out an attack was set to 0.4. We use a higher probability for CRCM since it has 
a centralized firewall running on a dedicated machine that can detect and filter out attacks more intelligently. 
However, we realize that the exact degree of difference in a real setting will vary depending on the strength 
of firewalls actually deployed.
The mean time to repair an offline server was set to 17 minutes in all the architectures.
The total number of hosts was set to 12. So that all architectures would have similar amounts of resources, 
that number includes the hosts running service components as well as the hosts running trusted components. 
Hence, CRCM had 10 hosts running service components and 2 hosts running trusted components (the Con­
figuration Manager and Gateway); MRCM had 11 hosts running service components and one host running 
a trusted component (the Configuration Manager); and SMR and MRDM each had all 12 hosts running 
service components. SMR had 3 additional hosts in the standby state.
The time interval considered is [0, 30 minutes]. The fraction of corrupt servers is measured at the end of 
this interval.
We used simulation to solve all the models; all results presented here have a 95% confidence interval.
4.1 Comparison under Varying Quality of Detection
For the CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM architectures, the Quality of Detection is the probability with which 
an intrusion detection system can ascertain that a system has been compromised, given that the system is 
actually corrupt. SMR does not have a separate intrusion detection system and detects intrusion primarily 
through Byzantine agreement by the group; the group members can know a corrupted member is corrupted 
only when it shows some misbehavior during the agreement, by deviating from the protocol specification. 
That is modeled by the probability of misbehavior.
To see the effect of the probability of detection in the performance and availability of the system, we 
conducted experiments in which we varied the detection probability from 0.0 (no intrusion detection) to 
1.0 (perfect intrusion detection). For SMR, the probability of misbehavior was varied from 0.0 (corrupt 
server does not misbehave at all) to 1.0 (corrupt server always misbehaves). A model for SMR with low 
misbehavior probability represents an attack scenario in which servers behave correctly (to avoid detection) 
for a long time after they have been corrupted, and start misbehaving in a correlated manner once enough 
servers have been compromised to thwart the Byzantine agreement.
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Figure 6: Varying Detection/Misbehavior Probability
As we can see in Figure 6(a), in the absence of an intrusion detection mechanism (or equivalently, in 
the absence of misbehavior in SMR), the strong unavailability of any architecture depends primarily on 
the architecture’s defense against intrusion attempts. Thus, CRCM shows the best performance and the 
least unavailability, because it has a strong firewall and better handling of multi-phase attacks. All the other 
architectures suffer because of weaker firewalls; MRCM performs the worst because it is most susceptible to 
multi-phase attacks due to lack of dispersion. When the probability of detection increases, all architectures 
become more available, but among CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM, the CRCM architecture remains the best 
and MRCM the worst for the same reasons. We notice that SMR is initially very sensitive to any increase 
in probability of misbehavior because as long as the Byzantine agreement requirement is met, any corrupt 
misbehaving servers can be immediately eliminated. However, for large values of misbehavior probability, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for more than one-third of the group to be corrupt at any one time (which is 
the criterion for unavailability in SMR). For that reason, for any probability higher than 0.2, SMR with 12 
servers shows almost 0 unavailability.
Figure 6(b) shows that SMR has the least amount of productive throughput, because all servers process 
every request. Its throughput does not change for misbehavior probabilities greater than 0.3, because above 
that value it is almost always available. A trend that is observed in all architectures is that beyond a certain 
detection probability (approximately 0.3 for the input parameter values used in this study), throughput does 
not show an appreciable increase. The reason is that throughput depends primarily on the system’s total 
service capacity (given by the service rate) and the arrival rate, and these parameters were kept constant in 
our studies. Among the CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM architectures, the differences in productive throughput 
reflect the fact that the number of hosts actually serving client requests varies across these architectures 
(MRDM has two more hosts than CRCM, and one more host than MRCM).
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4.2 Comparison under Varying Numbers of Hosts in the System
Varying the number of hosts in the system from 4 to 13 implies that the number of hosts serving requests 
(servers) varies from 2 to 11 in CRCM, from 3 to 12 in MRCM, and from 4 to 13 in SMR and MRDM.
For 4 hosts, SMR and MRDM are more unavailable than CRCM and MRCM (see Figure 7(a)), because 
they require Byzantine agreement in order to exclude corrupt servers, and 4 servers can tolerate at most 
one corruption. Given enough time, it may be easy to corrupt one server, and beyond that point, no further 
corruptions can be tolerated, hence affecting availability. Also, MRDM performs worse than SMR, because 
MRDM is considered unavailable in the strong sense even when one server is corrupt, while SMR is con­
sidered available until one-third of the servers are corrupt. SMR shows decreasing unavailability with an 
increasing number of hosts, because larger group size enables it to tolerate a larger number of simultaneous 
faults. However, unavailability for CRCM and MRCM increases with the number of hosts; that may seem 
counter-intuitive, but the greater number of hosts means that there is a greater chance that one host will 
be corrupt and online. Like SMR, a larger number of servers makes it easier for MRDM to detect corrupt 
servers and exclude them. On the other hand, because of the definition of strong unavailability, a larger 
number of servers makes it more likely that MRDM will have a corrupt server online. Because of these 
opposing forces, MRDM’s unavailability initially remains unchanged, and starts increasing later, because 
the negative effect of having more servers becomes more dominant.
Another interesting point to note is that CRCM does not show an appreciable increase in unavailability 
above 10 hosts. The reason is that for a fixed arrival rate and service rate of the individual servers, the 
waiting time for any request (and hence any attack) is negligible for 10 hosts, and is unaffected by a further 
increase in the number of hosts.
Figure 7(b) shows the productive throughput shown by different architectures as we increase the num­
ber of hosts. In SMR, all hosts process every request, so increasing the number of hosts does not help in 
increasing throughput; rather, productive throughput actually falls a little, because of an increase in agree-
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Figure 8: Variation in Measures with Varying Single-phase Attack Probability
ment delays. MRCM and MRDM show steady increase in productive throughput, which is to be expected 
from parallel processing architectures. On the other hand, CRCM does not show any increase in productive 
throughput when the number of hosts goes beyond 10, because at that point the central dispatcher starts 
acting as a bottleneck in the system, as mentioned before.
4.3 Comparison under Varying Single-phase Attack Rates
We conducted studies on the models to observe the effect of varying single-phase attack rates on the per­
formance and intrusion-tolerance characteristics of the architectures. For the CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM 
architectures, the probability that an incoming request is a single-phase attack was varied from 0 to 0.009 
in increments of 0.001 (which results in attack rates varying from 0 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1, since the 
request arrival rate is 100). Since we were looking at response to single-phase attacks, the probability of 
multi-phase attacks was set to 0. For SMR, the attack rate was varied along the same lines. All the other 
parameters were the same as we described at the beginning of this section.
Figure 8(a) shows the variation in the fraction of active servers that are corrupt for the CRCM, MRCM,
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and MRDM architectures. We observe that CRCM performs better than the other two architectures. That 
can be attributed to CRCM’s stronger centralized firewall as compared to the weaker local firewalls in 
MRCM and MRDM. Since dispersion of multi-phase attacks is not a factor in this study, MRGM performs 
comparably. The linear increase for CRCM and MRCM is as expected, but there is a rapid deterioration for 
MRDM. The reason is that in MRDM, for higher attack rates, there is a significant probability that more 
than a third of the servers will become corrupt before any detection, thus violating the Byzantine agreement 
requirement, and hence making it impossible for any corrupt server to be removed from the set of active 
servers.
Figure 8(b) shows the variation in strong unavailability for the CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM architectures. 
All the architectures perform similarly and are strongly affected by the rate of attacks. CRCM is slightly 
better due to its strong centralized firewall, and MRDM is slightly worse due to the failure of the Byzantine 
agreement algorithm for higher attack rates.
Figure 8(c) depicts the variation in productive throughput for the SMR architecture. The performance 
overhead due to the Byzantine agreement protocol increases with the number of servers in the system. How­
ever, instead of increasing linearly, it increases as a step function, with almost fixed-size jumps whenever 
the number of servers is of the form 3 /  +  1 (i.e., jumps at 4, 7, 10, and so on). This has been shown 
experimentally in [12]. Since the throughput varies inversely with the delay, the gain in throughput with 
decrease in the number of servers is more substantial when the number of servers is smaller. Increasing the 
attack rate decreases the number of servers; this decreases the Byzantine agreement overhead, and hence 
tends to increase the throughput. On the other hand, the probability of enough servers becoming corrupted 
to violate the Byzantine agreement requirement increases with increasing attack rates, hence decreasing 
productive throughput. The nature of this graph can be attributed to the competition between these two 
opposing forces. The former dominates the initial portion of the graph, while the latter dominates when the 
attack rate is higher. As explained above, the gain in throughput is not much when the expected number of 
servers online is high, and that leads to the domination of the latter force for very low attack rates, resulting 
in the initial dip in the graph.
Figure 8(d) shows the variation in productive throughput for the CRCM, MRCM, and MRDM architec­
tures. As expected, productive throughput decreases with increasing attack rates, as fewer correct servers 
are online. The relative performance of the architectures can be explained by the facts that CRCM has a 
performance bottleneck of centralized request routing, and that MRDM, MRCM, and CRCM have 12, 11, 
and 10 servers working in parallel, respectively.
4.4 Comparison under Varying Multi-phase Attack Rates
In this study, we vary the probability that a particular request is part of a multi-phase attack from 0 to 
0.009, while keeping the number of single-phase attacks at 0. Figure 9(a) shows that CRCM and MRDM 
(coinciding lines) perform better than MRCM with respect to strong unavailability. The reason is that multi-
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phase attacks in CRCM and MRDM are largely unsuccessful due to dispersion, and have a negligible effect 
on strong unavailability. The effect on MRCM becomes more evident when we look at the productive 
throughput for the three architectures in Figure 9(b). Though MRCM starts out better than CRCM because 
of one additional server, its performance degrades rapidly as we increase the probability of multi-phase 
attacks.
4.5 Comparison under Varying Repair Rates
When a corrupted server is detected, it is removed from the set of active servers, taken offline, and put 
into repair. After repair, the server is put back into the pool of active servers. The system would fail if there 
was no repair or the repair was not “fast enough,” i.e., if the mean time between successful attacks is shorter 
than the average time taken to repair a server and put it back into service. Only if repairs take less time than 
the duration between successive attacks is it possible to provide continuous service even in the presence of
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successful attacks. Thus, we can intuitively predict that a faster repair rate is crucial for ensuring that the 
system provides continuous service.
Figure 10 confirms this intuition. In obtaining the data for these graphs, we considered, for all architec­
tures, a set of 4 hosts running the service component. Additional hosts were used for the trusted management 
components (Gateway, Configuration Manager, and Firewall) if those components are required in the archi­
tecture. We varied the repair rate from 0 (no repair) to 0.5 (very fast repair rate: one repair every 2 minutes), 
while the other parameters were kept constant. The attack rate was kept constant at 0.08 per time unit. As 
the repair rate varies from 0 upwards, the graphs show that the good throughput increases until a saturation 
point. The saturation point is reached when the repair rate is faster than the attack rate. Increasing the repair 
rate beyond that point has some beneficial effects, but not substantial improvements. A similar trend can be 
observed from the graphs depicting the negative performance variables (such as weak unavailability). The 
saturation point (for a given estimate of the attack rate) represents the optimal repair rate; it is “optimal” in 
the sense of getting maximum benefit from minimal cost for repair.
From Figure 10(a), we can see that with no repair, CRCM performs the best, because of its strong firewall 
and its use of a dispersion mechanism. MRDM and MRCM do not have a strong firewall, but MRDM 
outperforms MRCM due to dispersion in the former. Since CRCM starts out with low unavailability, it is 
not affected substantially by an increase in repair rate. MRCM matches the low unavailability of the CRCM 
architecture after the optimal repair rate has been reached. The MRDM architecture, on the other hand, is 
not able to attain such low unavailability, even after the saturation point. The reason is that our experiments 
were conducted with 4 servers, and when the number of correct servers drops to 3, it is not possible to reach 
Byzantine agreement to remove the next corrupted server from the set of active servers.
Though the CRCM and MRCM architectures outperform the MRDM architecture in availability, with 
respect to correctness of replies (productive throughput), MRDM is clearly superior (as seen from Fig­
ure 10(b)). The duration between detection of an intrusion and removal of the corrupted server from the 
active set is shorter for MRDM than for the CRCM and MRCM architectures, due to the fact that it does not 
have the bottleneck of a centralized manager. Therefore, the number of potentially erroneous replies that a 
corrupted server could send before being removed would be less for the MRDM architecture than for other 
architectures. However, we expect that for a greater number of servers, this advantage may become less im­
portant for MRDM, because the overhead due to the Byzantine agreement protocol increases significantly 
as the number of servers increases, as shown experimentally in [12].
5 Conclusion
This work is the first attempt to evaluate intrusion-tolerant server architectures. We define a series of rel­
evant metrics and present a probabilistic evaluation and comparison of four representative intrusion-tolerant 
server architectures. The results present useful information about the intrusion tolerance and performance 
characteristics of the architectures, by means of varying system parameters such as the quality of intrusion
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detection, rate of attacks on the system, amount of resources, and time to repair an intruded server.
The results show that architectures that use a small number of trusted components to secure a large set 
of servers perform better in terms of availability than architectures with no trusted components when the 
level of redundancy in the system is not very large. However, practical experience [10] shows that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement truly trustworthy components. Such architectures also usually 
employ centralized decision-making, which is a potential performance bottleneck.
State-machine-replication-based architectures that employ Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols for agree­
ment on the request processing have the best intrusion tolerance characteristics, but they usually come at 
the expense of lower performance. Hence, such architectures are a good choice for implementing mission- 
critical systems for which the ability to withstand intrusions is more important than performance.
Architectures that employ decentralized decision-making and serve multiple requests in parallel have the 
best performance for a given amount of resources, since all the resources can be used for request processing. 
They are superior to centralized architectures for which a portion of resources need to be set aside for 
hosting trusted components. However, from an intrusion tolerance perspective, the effectiveness of such 
decentralized architectures is realized only when there is a sufficient degree of redundancy. We also observe 
that request dispersion mechanisms that introduce unpredictability in request routing are highly effective in 
defense against multi-phase attacks. It is critical that the mean time to repair be much less than the mean 
time between attacks. However, beyond a certain point, increasing the repair rate does not give appreciable 
added benefits.
We believe that our choice of values for model parameters is reasonable, but more importantly, our models 
allow system designers to evaluate alternative architectures by assigning different values for those parame­
ters as they deem appropriate. This certainly enhances their ability to make more informed choices between 
various intrusion-tolerant architectures easily and quickly, before undergoing the expensive process of build­
ing and evaluating multiple prototypes.
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APPENDIX A.l
SAN Modeling of the Centralized Routing Centralized Management
(CRCM) Architecture
Model: Client
Place Names Initial Markings
Requests 0..............,.....  -....................... ...... ,..... -.......... .......... .......-..............-................ f
Timed Activity: GenerateReqs
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters GEN_REQ_RATE
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Input Gate: MaxReqs
Predicate ( R e q u e s t s - > M a r k ()) < MAX_REQS
Function /
Model: ConflgM anager
: : : : : :
configRequestQ s eryg configReplyQ
Place Names T~ Initial Markings
};
configReplyQ j 0 I1
configRequestQ 1 0 •i
Timed Activity: Serve
Exponential
Distribution
Rate i
Parameters C onfM grR ate 1
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Model: FirewallGateway
Place Names Initial Markings
EscapedMultiPhase 0
EscapedSinglePhase 0
GoodReqs 0
Requests 0
Timed Activity: FilterRequests
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters F i l t e r R a t e
Activation Predicate 1
Reactivation Predicate 1
Case Distributions
case 1
P r o b F i l t e r i n g * P r o b S i n g l e P h a s e  
case 2
P r o b F i l t e r i n g  * P r o b M u l t iP h a s e  
case 3
1 - ( P r o b S i n g le P h a s e  + P ro b M u l t iP h a s e )
Input Gate: Filter
R e q u e s t s - >M ark( ) &&
( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + E s c a p e d M u l t iP h a s e - > M a r k () 
G o o d R eq s-> M ark ())  < MaxGwQLen
Predicate
Function R e q u e s t s - > M a r k ;
Model: Server
r'~'.. "• — . ..." ....
Place Names Initial Markings
Corruption 0
EscapedMultiPhase o
EscapedSinglePhase .......................................................... 0............_ .... ........_ _  ......... 1
GoodReqs 0
LocalGoodReqs 0
Local Multiphase 0
LocalSinglePhase 0
NumActive Num Servers{--
NumCorrupt 0
Offline 0
PhasesNeeded 0
ReqSent 0
configReplyQ 0
configRequestQ o............................. u ........ ................ -_________  _ . .J
Timed Activity: Detection
.............. '
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters DetectionRate
Activation Predicate 1
Reactivation Predicate !
Case Distributions
Timed Activity:
case 1
( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) /M ax P h ase s  
case 2
1 - ( ( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) /M ax P h ase s )
LoadBaiancing
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Activation
Predicate
Rate
L o a d B a la n c in g R a te
Reactivation
Predicate
Case
Distributions
case 1
( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e -  
>M ark() + E s c a p e d M u l t iP h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s-> M ark ())  
case 2
(E s c a p e d M u l t iP h a s e -> M a rk  0 * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () 
+ E s c a p e d M u l t iP h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s-> M ark () )  
case 3
(G o o d R eq s-> M ark ( ) * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () 
E s c a p e d M u l t iP h a s e - > M a r k () + G oodReqs- >M ark() )
Timed Activity:
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters R e p a i r R a te
Activation Predicate 
Reactivation Predicate
Repair
(none)
(none)
Timed Activity: ServeReq
Exponential
Distribution
Rate
Parameters S erv iceR a te
Activation
Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1
case 1
(L ocalS inglePhase->M ark 0 * 1 . 0 ) / (L oca lS in g leP h ase-> M ark () + 
L ocalM ultiP hase->M ark() + LocalGoodReqs->M ark())
Case case 2
Distributions
;
;
(L ocalM ultiPhase->M ark( ) * (NumActive->Mark( ) ? ( 1 . O/NumActive- 
>Mark()) : 0 ) ) / (L oca lS ing leP hase-> M ark() + L oca lM u ltiP h ase-  
>Mark() + LocalGoodReqs->M ark())  
case 3................ .... . ....... -........ ...- . ........ ............. .............. . . .. ................. . ...
!
(L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark( ) * ( 1 - (NumActive-
>Mark( ) ? ( 1 . O/NumActive->Mark()) : 0 ) ) ) / (L o ca lS in g le P h a se - 
>Mark() + L oca lM ultiP hase-> M ark () + LocalG oodReqs->M ark()) 
case 4
(LocalGoodReqs->Mark 0 * 1 . 0 ) / ( L o c a ls in g le P h a se - >Mark() + 
L oca lM ultiP hase-> M ark () + LocalG oodReqs->M ark())
instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
resetting
Input Gate: Detect
Predicate C o rru p tio n -> M ark () > 0 && O fflin e -> M a rk ( ) ==0 && 
R eqSent- >Mark( ) ==0
j
Function
; ........... .........— ,.................- .... - -,
Input Gate: PickReqs
Predicate
(E scapedS ing leP hase-> M ark() + E scapedM ultiP hase-> M ark() + 
GoodReqs->Mark()) > 0 
ScSc Of f  line-> M ark  ( ) ==0 &&
(L oca lS ing leP hase-> M ark () + LocalGoodReqs- >Mark()) < 
MaxServerQLen
Function
i /
Input Gate: RepairServer
Predicate iO ff lin e -> M a rk ()
Function
[
Of f  line-> M ark  0 = 0 ;
NumAc t  i  ve - >Mark () + + ;
Input Gate: Service
Predicate (L oca lS ing leP hase-> M ark () + L oca lM ultiP hase-> M ark() + 
LocalGoodReqs->M ark()) > 0
Function
; .............. ........ ................................................ . .......................................................... 1
Output Gate: EnQGood
Function
if(G oodR eqs->M ark()) {
GoodReqs- >Mark( ) - -  ;
LocalGoodReqs- >Mark()++;
>...........................................................................................................................
Output Gate: EnQMuIti
Function
i f  (E scapedM ultiPhase->M ark( ) ) {
E scapedM ultiPhase-> M ark( ) - -  ;
s h o r t  x = M axPhases> 2 ? ( ( s h o r t ) ( r a n d ()%(MaxPhases- 
2) )+ 2) : 2 ; //uncom m ent t h i s
/ / s h o r t  x = l ; //com m ent t h i s  
if(L o c a lM u ltiP h a se -> M a rk ( ) ==0) {
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark() = x ;
}
e l s e  {
/ /  p rob  o f choosing  num p h ases  in v e r s e ly  
p rop  to  # p h ases
s h o r t  y = x + L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark( ) ;  
s h o r t  z = 1 + ( ra n d ()%(y -1 ) ) ;  //uncomm ent
t h i s
/ / s h o r t  z = l ; //comm ent t h i s  
i f ( z  > x) {
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark() = x;
}
}
PhasesN eeded->M ark() = 1+ (sh o rt)  (L oca lM ultiP hase- 
>Mark() * f r a c P h a s e s ) ;
}
Output Gate: EnQSingle
Function
if(E sca p ed S in g le P h a se -> M ark ()) {
E scapedS ing leP hase-> M ark( ) - - ;  
L oca lS ing leP hase -> M ark ()++;
}
Output Gate: ResetState
______________ „ J
Function
Of f line-> M ark  0 = 1 ;
L oca lS ing leP hase -> M ark () =0 ; 
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark() =0 ; 
LocalGoodReqs- >Mark 0 = 0 ;  
NumActive->M ark( ) - -  ;
i f  (C o rrup tion -> M ark () == MaxPhases) 
NumCorrupt- >Mark( ) - -  ; 
C orruption->M ark 0 = 0 ;
Output Gate: ServeGoodReq
Function if(L ocalG oodR eqs->M ark()) {LocalGoodReqs- >Mark( ) - -  ;
}
Output Gate: ServeMuItiPhaseFail
Function
;
if(L o c a lM u ltiP h ase -> M ark ()) {
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark( ) - -  ; 
if (L o c a lM u ltiP h ase -> M ark ( ) ==0) {
i f  (C orrup tion -> M ark() < MaxPhases) { 
C orrup tion -> M ark ()=0 ;
}
PhasesN eeded->M ark() = 0;
}
}
Output Gate: ServeMultiPhaseSucc
Function
if (L o c a lM u ltiP h a se -> M a rk ()) {
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark( ) -  - ; 
s h o r t  f lag = 0 ;
if(Corruption->Mark() < PhasesNeeded->Mark()) {
Corruption->Mark()++; 
f l a g = l ;
}if (Corruption->Mark() >= PhasesNeeded->Mark())
L ocalM ultiP hase-> M ark()=0 ; 
PhasesN eeded->M ark() = 0; 
i f  ( f la g  == 1)
{
C o rru p tio n -> M ark () = MaxPhases; 
NumCorrupt- >Mark()++;
}
Output Gate: ServeSinglePhase
Function
if (L o c a lS in g le P h a se -> M a rk ()) {
L oca lS ing leP hase -> M ark ( ) - - ;  
i f  (C orrup tion -> M ark() < MaxPhases)
{
C orrup tion -> M ark () = MaxPhases; 
NumCorrupt- >Mark()++;
}
}
Output Gate: detected
Function configR equestQ ->M ark( ) = 1; 
R eqSent->M ark() = 1;
Model: CRCM
Server
Rep Node Reps Shared State Variables
EscapedMultiPhase
EscapedSinglePhase
GoodReqs
Servers Num Servers NumActive
NumCorrupt
configReplyQ
configRequestQ
Join Node: Joinl :
State Variable Name Submodel Variables
ConfigReplyQ Servers->configReplyQ
ConfigManager->configReplyQ
EscapedMultiPhase Servers->EscapedMultiPh ase
FirewallGw->EscapedMultiPhase
EscapedSinglePhase Servers->EscapedSinglePhase
F irewallGw->EscapedS inglePhase
GoodReqs
Servers->GoodReqs
FirewallGw->GoodReqs
Requests
C1ient->Requests
Fire wal 1G w->Requests
configRequestQ Servers->configRequestQ
ConfigManager->configRequestQ
Performance Variable Model: CRCM PV
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name CRCM______________ _______!
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : throughput
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Server->ServeReq_case4
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll A va ilab le  Models)
Simulator Statistics
1
!
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : arrivalrate
Affecting Models FirewallGw
Impulse Functions
F irewallG w->F ilterRequestscase 1
(Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
return 1;
F irewallGw->FilterRequests_case2
(Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
return 1+(MaxPhases/2.0);
Firewal lGw->Fi IterRequests case3
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
Estimate Mean
1 j
Optionsi;
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
: ii 1 s Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : fracCorruptServers
A ffectin g  M odels Server
Im pulse Functions . . ■ ! ..... ......-....... -....... .............. .... .. ....... ......... ......  . .  ,.... , ... _...._.. ... ,........ ,.-.. ..... ...... .......... ....... .............
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll A va ilab le  Models)
i f  (Server-C orruption->M ark() == MaxPhases && Server->O ffline->M ark() == 0) 
return 1 .0/Server->NumActive->Mark() ;
Sim ulator Statistics
Type Instant o f  Time
Options
Estimate Mean
Include L ower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out o f  Range Probabilities
C onfidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 30.0
C onfidence
C onfidence Level 0.95
C onfidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : StrongUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function if(Server->NumActive->Mark()==0) return 1.O/NumServers;
if  (Server->Offline->Mark()==0 && Server->Corruption->Mark() == MaxPhases) 
return 1.0/Server->NumCorrupt->Mark();
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
\
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : WeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()) 
return 1.O/NumServers;
Simulator Statistics Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Level 0.95Confidence ,------- —--------------- —----- -------- -----
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : numCorrupt
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(R e w a r d  is  o v e r  a l l  A v a ila b le  M o d e ls )
return (Server->Corruption->Mark()>=MaxPhases);
Type Instant of Time
Simulator Statistics
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : goodth rough put
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Server->ServeReq_case4
(R e w a r d  is o v e r  a l l  A v a ila b le  M o d e ls)
if (Server-¡»Corruption->Mark() < MaxPhases) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(R e w a r d  is o v e r  a ll  A v a ila b le  M o d e ls )
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics ¡Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative.................. _...... .
„ Start Time 0.0r dI dllldCI b
Stop Time 30.0
_ Confidence Level 0.95L/UllilUCHLC
¡Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : badthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions <Reward “  over aU Models)
if(Server->Corruption->Mark() >= MaxPhases) 
return 1.0;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Simulator Statistics
Type Time Averaged Interval of Timer..... . 11 . ..... .
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence
1
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable Model: CRCM PV SS
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name CRCM
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : SSfracCorruptServers
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() == MaxPhases && Server->Offline->Mark() 
return 1.O/Server->NumActive->Mark();
== 0)
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSStrongUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll A va ilab le  Models)
if(Server->NumActive->Mark()==0) return 1.O/NumServers;
if (Server->Offline->Mark()==0 && Server->Corruption->Mark() == MaxPhases) 
return 1.0/Server->NumCorrupt->Mark();
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSWeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()) 
return 1.0/NumServers;
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSnumCorrupt
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
\
return (Server->Corruption->Mark()>=MaxPhases);
Simulator Statistics Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
^ x Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSgoodth rough put
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4 Ì
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() < MaxPhases)
return 1 ;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSbadthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() >= MaxPhases)
return 1.0;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate__j
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Detection in Project C R C M  :
Variable
r
Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type Function n!1
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - - -
i_ 1
D etectionR ate double Fixed .6 - - -
! ! 
- i
FilterRate double Fixed 200 - '-
!
- J
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 - - "
Load Baiane ingRate double Fixed 12 -
M AX REQS int Fixed 50 - -
M axG w Q Len short Fixed 50 - - - . ii
M axPhases short Fixed 5 - - - -
M axServerQLen short F ixed 10 - -
Num Servers short Fixed 10 - - -
ProbDetection double Manual
[0. .1, .2, .3, .4, .6, 
•8, 1]
- - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed .25 - - - -
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed .001 - - ” -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - - - -
RepairRate double Fixed 0.06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 20 - - -
frac Phases double Fixed .6 “ " . “
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study CRCMJStudy in Project C R C M  :
Variable Type Range Type
1
Range Increment IncrementType Function n___]
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - - . -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1-6 - - -
FilterRate double Fixed ¡200 - - - "
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 - ■ . j!
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed ¡12 - . -
j
:  j
MAX REQS int Fixed 50 - - -
M axGwQLen short Fixed 50 - ' ' "
M axPhases short Fixed 5 - - .  !...
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 - - . '
Num Servers short Fixed 10 - '
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 - - - i
ProbFiltering double Fixed 1 .2 5 - ‘ -
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed ¡.001 - - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed i.002 - . . .
RepairRate double Fixed 0.06 -
ServiceRate double Fixed
i .....................
20 - * - . i
frac Phases double Fixed ,6 ' . "
. J
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study CRCM_Study_SS in Project CRCM:“1------------- - --------- —|-------
Variable Type
T"..... ....
Range Type
T
Range Increment IncrementType Function n
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - T“ -
D etectionRate double Fixed .6 r r f
FilterRate double Fixed 200 r-i
_ ...... ~ - -
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100
1......... 11..........
-
r _
- !- L;
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed 12
......................
* ‘ -
M AX REQS int Fixed 50
_ .........................
"
1
*
M axGwQLen short Fixed 50 - - - .
M axPhases short Fixed 5 " - .
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 - -
Num Servers short Fixed 10 - _ -
Pro b Detect ion double Fixed .5 ■ - - 1
Prob Filtering double Fixed .25 ■
. : 1
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed .001 - *
\
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - ............  ..
... . ..
- j
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - •
_ _ _ j
ServiceRate double Fixed 20 i - -
frac Phases double Fixed .6 1 ”
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study MultiPhase in Project CRCM :
Variable Type RangeType
I
Range Increment IncrementType Function n
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - -
DetectionRate double Fixed .6 - - -
FilterRate double Fixed 200 - - -
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 - - - "
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed 12 ■ - .
M AX REQS int Fixed 50 -
M axGwQLen short Fixed 50 - -
M axPhases short Fixed 5 -
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 - - -
NumServers short Fixed 10 - - -
ProbDetection double Fixed •5 - " "
ProbFiltering double Fixed .25 - - -
ProbMultiPhase double Incremental [0 .0 .0 .009000000000000001 ] .001 A dditive -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed 0 .................* - -
RepairRate double Fixed 0.06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 20 ” . -
frac Phases double Fixed .6 - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study NumServers in Project CRCM :
Variable
j
Type Range Type Range
!
\!
Increment IncrementType Function "
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 r _ - !- :
D etection Rate double Fixed .6 > - -
FilterRate double Fixed 200
i .
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 |- -
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed 12 . " - - J
M AX REQS int Fixed 50 " .
!
* I
M axG wQ Len short Fixed 50 -J
M axPhases short Fixed 5 -
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 . " ........—...... .....—--
N um Servers
, ....
short Incremental [2 ,11] 3 Additive - -
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 - - -
ProbFiltering
.. ..........
double Fixed .25 - -
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed .001
~
- -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - - _ -j-------— -- ---- --- -
RepairRate ¡double Fixed 0.06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 20 - - - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 1 1 1"
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study R e p a ir  in Project C R C M :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type Function n
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - - - -
DetectionRate double Fixed .6 - - - -
FilterRate double Fixed 200 - "
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 - - - -
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed 12 - -
MAX REQS int Fixed 50 - - -
M axGwQLen short Fixed 50 _
M axPhases short Fixed 5 - - ■
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 - " -
Num Servers short Fixed 10 ' -
ProbDetection double Fixed •5 - - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed .25 - ~ ' ;j
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed .001 - ” - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - -!
RepairRate double Manual
[0, .01, .02, .03, .04, 
.05, .1, .15]
- -
..........i
ServiceRate double
■ ' . ..... . -
Fixed 20
.....
.
" '
fracPhases double Fixed .6 -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study S in g le P h a s e  in Project C R C M :
\
Variable
;
Type RangeType
1
Range
1----------------
Increment IncrementType
r ~  —
Function
■
n
ConfM grRate double Fixed h o
I
i - r r
D etectionR ate double Fixed: .6 -
T— - ---------- .
:
FilterRate double Fixed ¡200 - i ” ~ *
1------ - ---
- •
GEN REQ RATE float Fixed 100 - F ^ -
LoadBalancingRate double Fixed 12 - -
M A X  REQS int Fixed 50
...
■ - -
M axG wQ Len short Fixed 50 -
.
" -
M axPhases short Fixed 5 - -
M axServerQLen short Fixed 10 - - - “
Num Servers short Fixed 10 - - !-
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 - - _
ProbFiltering double Fixed .25 - - .
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed 0 - - -
ProbSinglePhase double Incremental
oooooooooooooooooÖ©Ö
.001 A dditive - f
RepairRate double Fixed 0.06 -
ServiceRate double Fixed 20 - ‘ -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 1- |-
APPENDIX A.2
SAN Modeling of the Multicast Routing Centralized Management
(MRCM) Architecture
Model: ConfigM anager
• • ^ ...........  ^ '-----  H ---------- —--- ■ ■ •
configRequestQ Serve configReplyQ
Place Names Initial Markings
configR eplyQ r  “7 ::::: ... « _ _ _ _  ___i
configR equestQ 0
Timed Activity: Serve
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters Conf M gr Rate
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Model: Firewall
Place Names Initial Markings
EscapedM ultiPhase 0
EscapedSinglePhase 0
G oodR eqs 0
N um A ctive NumServers
O ffline 0
PhasesN eeded 0........ ......... . . . ........................
Timed Activity: FilterRequests
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
F i l t e r R a t e * ( N u m A c t i v e -
> M ar k ( ) > 0 ? ( N u m S e r v e r s * l . 0 / N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k () )  : 0)
Activation Predicate
1 ..............................................................................
Reactivation
Predicate 1 ..................................................___ ____________ ______  _  i
Case Distributions
case 1
P r o b F i l t e r i n g * P r o b S i n g l e P h a s e  
case 2
P r o b F i l t e r i n g * P r o b M u l t i P h a s e  
case 3
1 - ( P r o b S i n g l e P h a s e + P r o b M u l t i P h a s e )
Input Gate: Filter
Predicate
( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s -> M ark () )  < 
MaxGwQLen
&& O f f l i n e - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function 7
Output Gate: MPAttack
Function
s h o r t  x  = M a x P h a s e s > 2 ? ( ( s h o r t ) ( r a n d ( ) %( M a x P h a s e s - 2 ) ) + 2 ) :2 ;
/ / r e m o v e d  t o  r e d u c e  s t a t e  s p a c e
/ / s h o r t  x = l ; / / c o m m e n t  t h i s  when e n a b l i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
l i n e
i f ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) ==0) {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () = x ;
}
e l s e  {
/ /  p r o b  o f  c h o o s i n g  num p h a s e s  i n v e r s e l y  p r o p  t o  #
p h a s e s
s h o r t  y  = x  + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) ;  
s h o r t  z = 1 + ( r a n d ( ) % ( y - 1 ) ) ;  / / r e m o v e d  
t o  r e d u c e  s t a t e  s p a c e
/ / s h o r t  z = l ; / / c o m m e n t  t h i s  when e n a b l i n g  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  l i n e
i f ( z  > x) {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () = x ;
}
}
P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () = 1 + ( s h o r t ) ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () * 
f r a c P h a s e s ) ;
Model: Server
resetting configReplyQ
configRequestQ
Place Names Initial Markings
Corruption 0......... ........ .....................- ......  -............. ..... ....... . ... .............
EscapedM ultiPhase 0
EscapedSinglePhase 0
G oodR eqs 0
N um A ctive NumServers
NumCorrupt o
O ffline 0
PhasesN eeded 0
ReqSent 0
configR eplyQ 0
configRequestQ 0
Timed Activity: Detection
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
D e t e c t i o n R a t e
Activation Predicate
Reactivation Predicate
1 ..........................................................................................................................
Case Distributions
case 1
( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) / M ax P h as e s  
case 2
1 - ( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) / M ax P h as e s
Timed Activity: Repair
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
R e p a i r R a t e
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Timed Activity: ServeReq
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
S e r v i c e R a t e
Activation
Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1
Case
Distributions
case 1
( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k  0 * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e -  
> M ark () + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) + GoodR eqs - >Mark ())  
case 2
( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + 
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + G oodR eqs - >M ar k ())  
case 3
(GoodReqs->Mark 0 * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + 
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + GoodR eqs - > M ark ())
Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
resetting
Input Gate: Detect
Predicate C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () > 0 && O ff l i n e - > M a r k ( ) ==0 && 
R e q S e n t - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function /
Input Gate: RepairServer
Predicate
l O ff l i n e - > M a r k ( )
Function
Of f  l i n e - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;  
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ()++;
Input Gate: Service
;
Predicate ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + 
G o o d R e q s - > M a r k ( ) )  > 0
Function ;
Output Gate: ResetState
Function
O f f l i n e - > M a r k ( ) = 1 ;  / /  t a k e  o f f l i n e  r i g h t  now i n s t e a d  o f  
w a i t i n g  f o r  CM r e p l y  
E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k 0 = 0 ;
GoodReqs  - >Mark 0 = 0 ;
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ( ) - - ;
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ==MaxPhases)  N u m C o r ru p t -> M a rk  0  - - ;  
C o r r u p t i o n -  >Mark 0 = 0 ;
Output Gate: ServeGoodReq
Function i f ( G o o d R e q s - > M a r k () )  {G oodR eqs - >M ark( ) - -  ;
}
Output Gate: ServeMultiPhaseSucc
Function
i f ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () )  {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) - -  ; 
s h o r t  f l a g  = 0;
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () < P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () )  { 
C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () + + ;  
f l a g = l ;
}
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () >= P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () )
{
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e -  >Mark 0 = 0 ;  
P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () = 0;
C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () = M a x P h a s e s ;  
i f  ( f l a g = = l )
N u m C o r r u p t - > M a r k ( ) + + ;
1
Output Gate: ServeSinglePhase
Function
i f ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () )  {
E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) - - ;  
i f  ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () < MaxPhas es)  
N u m C o r r u p t - > M a r k ()++ ;
C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () = M ax P h as e s ;
>.......................................................................................................
Output Gate: detected
Function c o n f i g R e q u e s t Q - > M a r k () = 1; 
R e q S e n t - > M a r k () = 1;
Model: M RCM
Rep Node Reps Shared State Variables
NumActive
Repl Num Servers
NumCorrupt
configReplyQ
configRequestQ
Join Node: Joinl :
State Variable Name Submodel Variables
EscapedMultiPhase Server->EscapedMultiPhase
Firewall->EscapedMultiPhase
EscapedSinglePhase Server->EscapedSinglePhase
F irewall->EscapedSinglePhase
GoodReqs
Server->GoodReqs
Firewall->GoodReqs
NumActive Server->Num Active
F irewal l->Num A cti ve
NumCorrupt Server->NumCorrupt
Offline
Server->0ffline
Firewall->Offline
...  ..................................... ............ ........... ... . . . .  .. . . . . . .
PhasesNeeded
Server->PhasesNeeded
F irewal l->Ph asesN eeded
configReplyQ Server->configReplyQ
configRequestQ Server->configRequestQ
1j
Join Node: Join2 :
State Variable Name Submodel Variables
configReplyQ
Repl ->configReplyQ
ConfigManager->configReplyQ
configRequestQ
Rep 1 ->configRequestQ
ConfigManager->configRequestQ
Performance Variable Model: MRCM PV
Child Model Name MRCMTop Level Model Information
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : throughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case3
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time 
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0. ______1
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable: arrivalrate
Affecting Models Firewall
F irewall->F ilterRequestscase 1 
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1;
F irewall->F i lterRequests_case2 
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return (1+(MaxPhases/2.0));
F irewal 1->F i lterRequests_case3 
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1 ;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
j
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time
0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : fracCorruptServers
Affecting Models Server
Impulse
Functions
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator
Statistics
if  (Server->NumActive->Mark() > 0)
return Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()*1.0/(Server->NumActive- 
>Mark()*NumServers);
Type Instant of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 30.0
Confidence
1
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : StrongUnavailability T..._ J
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions j
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Reward Function if(Server- >NumCorrupt->Mark()>0 || Server->NumActive->Mark()==0) 
return 1.0/NumServers;
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : WeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over a ll Available Models
Reward Function if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark () )
return 1.0/NumServers;
Simulator Statistics Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : numCorrupt
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function (Reward is over a ll Available Models)return (Server-Corruption->Mark()>=MaxPhases?l.0:0);
Type Instant of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 30.0
^ _, Confidence Level 0.95vUllilUvllvC
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : goodthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Server->ServeReq_case3
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() < MaxPhases) return 1;
Reward Function (R e w a rd  i s  o v e r  a l l  A v a i l a b l e  M o d e ls )
|
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics
i
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
„ Start Time 0.0Jl Ctl all ICICI b
Stop Time 30.0
„ _ , Confidence Level 0.95V_sUlll lUClIvv
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : badthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case3
Impulse Functions <Reward is over al! ÄvailMe Models>
if (Server-¡»Corruption->Mark ( ) == MaxPhases) 
return 1 ;
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable Model: MRCM PV SS
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name MRCM 
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : SSfracCorruptServers
Affecting Models Server
Impulse
Functions
Reward Function
i
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->NumActive->Mark() > 0)
return Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()*1.0/(Server->NumActive- 
>Mark()*NumServers);
Type Steady State
Simulator
Statistics
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative _._.._..._..I
„ Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 000.0
„ _, Confidence Level ().95oUl 11 IUCI1LC
Confidence Interval ().01
Performance Variable : SSStrongUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if(Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()>0 | | Server->NumActive->Mark()==0) 
return 1.O/NumServers;
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
„ _, Confidence Level 0.95v/UllllUvllvv
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSWeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server 
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()) 
return 1.O/NumServers;
Type Steady State
Options
Simulator Statistics
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSnumCorrupt
Affecting Models 
Impulse Functions
Server
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
return (Server- ¡»Corruption->Mark () >=MaxPhases?l .0:0) ;
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
„ Initial Transient 5.0i dl alllCLCI j
Batch Size 1000.0
_ _ , Confidence Level 0.95v^ UllI IUCIIvC
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSgoodthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case3
Impulse Functions <Reward over Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() < MaxPhases) 
return 1;
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics Type Steady State
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSbadthroughput
Affecting Models Server 
Server->ServeReq_case3
Impulse Functions (Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() == MaxPhases) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 
Batch Size
Confidence Confidence Level 
Confidence Interval
5.0
1000.0 
0.95
0.01
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Detection in Project MRCM :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type
s
Function „
ConfMgrRate double Fixed 10 _ .
Detection Rate double Fixed 1 - -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 - - _
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10 - l .
M axPhases short Fixed 5 _ - ■
NumServers short Fixed 11 ~ -
1
ProbDetection double Manual
[0. .1, .2, .3, .4. .6, .8. 
1]
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4 - !
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed .001 - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - - - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - - - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study MRCM_Study in Project MRCM :
V ariab le
r---------------
T ype R an ge  T yp e R ange In crem en t
i
In crem en t _
F unction
T ype
n
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - -
D etectionRate double Fixed 1 - -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 - -
M axGwQLen short Fixed ,0
r-i i
Max Phases short Fixed 5 . . -
NumServers short Fixed 11 ”
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 - - .
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4 r -
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed .001 _ _ -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 1 . -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 r !-
i
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 i- " -
R ange S tudy V ariab le  A ssignm ents for S tudy M RCM StudySS  in P roject MRCM:
.
:
V ariab le T yp e R an ge T ype R ange ¡Increm ent
In crem en t _
F unction
T ype
n !
i 1
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 1-
.
........ .................... ....... ....
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - J
7 I
FilterRate double Fixed 10 . -
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10 - -
M axPhases short Fixed 5 r ■
] . j
NumServers short Fixed 11 -
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 -
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4 - - -
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed .001 _ - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 _ - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study MultiPhase in Project MRCM :
Variable Type RangeType
_ Increment _Range Increment ^ Function n
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 . . . .
D etection Rate double Fixed 1 -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 . . . .
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10 - - -
M axPhases short Fixed 5 . . . .
N um Servers short Fixed 11 -
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 -
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4 . . . .
ProbM ultiPhase double Incremental [0 .0 ,0 .009000000000000001] .001 Additive
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed 0 . . . .
RepairRate double Fixed .06 F  - -
Service Rate double Fixed ¡16 . . . .
frac Phases double Fixed .6 . . . .
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study NumServers in Project MRCM:
Variable Type Range Type
:
Range Increment Increment Function nType
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 f L L 1. |
Detection Rate double Fixed 1
FilterRate double Fixed 10 .
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10
-
r
_
M axPhases short Fixed 5 17
NumServers short Incremental [3.12] 3 A dditive
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 -
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed .001 \ -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - -
frac Phases double Fixed .6 - .
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Repair in Project MRCM :
Variable _ Increment Range Increment _Type Function nfC
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 - -
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10 - - 1 : I
Max Phases short Fixed 5 - -
NumServers short Fixed 11 - - -
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 - .
ProbFiltering double Fixed .4 - - -
ProbM ultiPhase double Fixed .001 - - - '
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - "  J
RepairRate double Manual
[0. .01. .02, .03, .04, .05, .1. 
.1 5 ..2 ]
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 .
fracPhases double Fixed .6 -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study SinglePhase in Project MRCM
!
;
Variable Type Ra"ge ,ype Type
Increment
Range Increment Type Function
t
n
i
ConfM grRate double Fixed 10 - 1- ' :----  _ ------  - ~ T
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 - .
M axGwQLen short Fixed 10 -
Max Phases short Fixed 5
NumServers short Fixed 11 - - -
ProbDetection double Fixed 5 - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 4 “ -
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed 0 - -
ProbSinglePhase double Incremental [0 .0 ,0 .009000000000000001] 0.001 Additive - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 _ -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - -
APPENDIX A.3
SAN Modeling of the State Machine Replication (SMR) Architecture
Model: Client
Place Names Initial Markings
N urn Active NumReps
Requests 0
Timed Activity: GenerateReqs
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
GenReqRate
Activation Predicate (none) 1
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Input Gate: MaxReqs
Predicate (Requests->Mark()) ==0
Function
f
Requests->Mark() = NumActive->Mark() ;
Model: ManualRepair
HostsToRepair RepairHosts IdleHosts
Place Names Initial Markings
HostsToRepair 0
IdleHosts NumHosts-NumReps
Timed Activity: RepairHosts
Exponential
Distribution
Rate
Parameters H ostR epairR ate
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Model: Server
Place Names Initial Markings
Corruption ! 0
HostsToRepair j 0
IdleHosts 1 NumHosts-NumReps
N urn A ctive NumReps
NumCorrupt Ì 0
Replies 0
Requests 0
SentReply 0
Shutdown 0
Sync In Progress 0
Timed Activity: Attack
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters A ttack R ate
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Timed Activity: Service
Exponential Rate 
Distribution
Parameters S e r v i c e R a t e
Activation 
Predicate 1
Reactivation 
Predicate 1
—--- ------------ ---- ;--- —....~~ ..... -------------------------- --- — -
case 1
( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k  ( ) > 0 ) ? ( ( 3 *N um C orrup t - > M ar k () <
. NumA ct ive ->M ark  ( ) ) ? P r o b M i s b e h a v i o r  : 0) : 0 Case Distributions „ case 2
( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) > 0 ) ? ( ( 3 *Nu m Corrup t - > M ark () < 
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ( ) ) ? ( 1 - P r o b M i s b e h a v i o r )  :1)  :1
Timed Activity: StartupServer
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
S e r v e r s t a r t R a t e
Activation Predicate (none)
Reactivation Predicate (none)
Instantaneous Activities Without Cases:
Ready
Input Gate: Process
Predicate
|
R e q u e s t s - > M a r k ( ) >0 && S e n t R e p l y - > M a r k ( ) ==0 &&
S h u t d o w n - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function v „R e q u e s t s - > M a r k ( ) - -  ; 
S e n t R e p l y - > M a r k  0 = 1 ;
Input Gate: ReadyServer
Predicate S y n c I n P r o g r e s s - > M a r k ( ) ==0 && S e n t R e p l y - > M a r k ( ) ==1
Function S e n t R e p l y - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;
Input Gate: StartServer
Predicate S h u td o w n - > M a r k () && I d l e H o s t s - > M a r k ( ) >0
Function
S h u td o w n - > M a r k ( ) = 0 ; 
I d l e H o s t s - > M a r k ( ) - -  ; 
S e n t R e p l y - > M a r k ()=0 ;  
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ()+ + ; 
C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () = 0 ;
Input Gate: corrupt
Predicate C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function
C o r r u p t i o n -  >Mark 0 = 1 ;
NumCorrupt->Mark()+ + ;
Output Gate: ConvictRepIy
Shu td ow n  - >Mark 0 = 1 ;
Function N umActive- >M ark  () - - ;
N u m C o r r u p t - > M ark ( ) - -  ; 
H o s t s T o R e p a i r - > M a r k () ++ ;
Output Gate: SimpleReply
Function R e p l i e s - > M a r k () ++; i f ( S y n c I n P r o g r e s s - > M a r k ( ) = = 0) 
S e n t R e p l y -  >Mark 0 = 1 ;
S y n c I n P r o g r e s s - > M a r k  0 = 1 ;
Model: Synchronizer
SyncInProgress
Send. Agreement
NumCorrupt
Place Names Initial Markings
NumAct i ve NumReps
NumCorrupt 0
Replies 0
SyncInProgress 0
Timed Activity: Agr e e me nt
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
1 . 0 / ( A g r e e m e n t D e l a y + I n c r e m e n t a l D e l a y *  ( ( N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k  ()  - 
l ) / 3 ) )
Activation
Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1
Input Gate: Send
Predicate R e p l i e s - > M a r k ( ) ==N umA ct ive -> M ar k()
Function S y n c I n P r o g r e s s - > M a r k ()=0 ;
R e p l i e s - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;
Model: SMR
Rep Node Reps Shared State Variables
HostsToRepair
IdleHosts
S e rve rs NumReps
i
NumActive
NumCorrupt
Replies
Requests
SyncInProgress
Join Node: Joinl :
State Variable Name Submodel Variables
HostsToRepair Servers->HostsT oRepair
ManualRepair->HostsToRepair
IdleHosts
Servers->IdleHosts
ManualRepair->IdleHosts
Servers->NumActive
NumActive Sy n chron i zer->Num A cti ve 
Client->NumActive
NumCorrupt Servers->NumCorrupt
Synchronizer->NumCorrupt
Replies
Servers->Replies
Synchronizer->Replies
Requests
Servers->Requests
Client->Requests
SyncInProgress Servers->SyncInProgress
Synchronizer->SyncInProgress
Performance Variable Model: SMR PV
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name
SMR
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : arrivalrate
Affecting Models Client
Client->GenerateReqs
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll A va ilab le  Models)
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics
•
■
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
_ Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
_ Confidence Level 0.95vUIliluCIlvC
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : totalth rough put
Affecting Models Synchronizer
Synchronizer->Agreement ;
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Ava ilab le  Models)
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
i
1
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean i_______!
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : Unavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
Reward Function if((3*Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()+1)>Server->NumActive- 
return 1.0/NumReps;
>Mark())
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : goodthroughput 1.__i
Affecting Models Synchronizer
Synchronizer->Agreement
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
if (3*Synchronizer->NumCorrupt->Mark() < Synchronizer->NumActive->Mark()) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
....I
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : badthroughput
Affecting Models Synchronizer
Synchronizer->Agreement
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
if (3*Synchronizer->NumCorrupt->Mark() >= Synchronizer->NumActive->Mark() ) 
return 1 ;
Reward Function (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Type
Options
Simulator Statistics
Parameters
Confidence
Time Averaged Interval of Time 
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable Model: SMR PV SS
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name SMR 
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : SSUnavailability
Affecting Models Server 
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll A va ilab le  Models)
if((3*Server->NumCorrupt->Mark 0+1)>Server->NumActive->Mark() 
return 1.0/NumReps;
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient
5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSgoodthroughput
Affecting Models Synchronizer
Synchronizer->Agreement
Impulse Functions (Reward “  over al' Available Models)
if (3*Synchronizer->NumCorrupt->Mark() < Synchronizer->NumActive->Mark()) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Type
Options
Simulator Statistics
Parameters
Confidence
Steady State 
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Include Upper Bound on interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative 
Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSbadthroughput
Affecting Models Synchronizer
Impulse Functions
Synchronizer->Agreement
(Reward is oxer a ll Available Models)
if (3*Synchronizer->NumCorrupt->Mark() >= Synchronizer->NumActive->Mark()) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Simulator Statistics
Type Steady State
Options
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Attack  in Project SM R -pro ject :
Variable Type ^ an§e Range Incrément n^<^ ement Function nType Type
AgreementDelay double Fixed .01 -
Attack Rate double Incremental [0.0,0 . 09999999999999999]  .01 Additive -
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 . . . -
HostRepairRate double Fixed 0.02 -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .005 -
N urn Hosts short Fixed 15 . . . -
NumReps short Fixed 12 . . . -
ProbMisbehavior double Fixed .5 . . . -
ServerStartRate doubl e Fi xed 2 . . . -
Servi ceRat e doubl e Fi xed 19 . . . -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study SMR_Study in Project SMR-project:
Variable Type Range Type Range Increment
Increment _^  Function Type n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .01 - - - -
AttackRate double Fixed .03 - - - -
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 - - - -
HostRepairRate double Fixed 0.02 - - - -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .005 - - - -
N urn Hosts short Fixed 15 - - - -
NumReps short Fixed 12 - - - -
ProbMisbehavior double Fixed .5 - - - -
ServerStartRate double Fixed 2 - - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 19 - - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study SM R StudySS  in Project SMR-project :
Variable Type Range Type Range Increment
Increment „_ Function Type
]
n
....
AgreementDelay double Fixed .01 - " -
AttackRate double Fixed .03 '
_ .
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 - -
1
|-
j
-__J
HostRepairRate double Fixed .02 - _ -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .005 - - -
N um Hosts short Fixed 15 - 1 -
NumReps short Fixed 12 - -
j i
ProbMisbehavior double Fixed •5 - . '
ServerStartRate double Fixed i- " - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 12 ~ - r
:
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Misbehavior in Project SM R -pro ject :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment „^ Function Type n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .0 - - -
AttackRate double Fixed .03 - - .
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 - - -
HostRepairRate double Fixed 0.02 - -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .005 - - -
Num Hosts short Fixed 15 - - -
NumReps short Fixed
ProbMisbehavior double Manual
ServerStartRate double Fixed
ServiceRate double Fixed
12
w,
1]
2
19
1, .2, .3, .4, .6, .8,
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study NumServers in Project SMR-project:
Variable Type Range Type Range T . Increment Increment __Type Function n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .01 - - -
AttackRate double Fixed .03 - - -
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 - - -
HostRepairRate double Fixed 0.02 - 1- -
IncrementalDeiay double Fixed .005 - - -
Num Hosts short Incremental [7,16] 3 Additive -
NumReps short Incremental [4 J 3 ] Additive -
ProbMisbehavior double Fixed .5 _ - -
ServerStartRate double Fixed 2 - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 19 L -
_____ ___ .. , - . _ . .... _ _ __..........  ... _ _ __ _____ . . .  . j
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Repair in Project SMR-project :
Variable Type RangeType Range
,  , Increment Increment _Type Function n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .01 ” - -
AttackRate double Fixed .03 - . - -
GenReqRate double Fixed 100 - ! jV.
HostRepairRate double Manual
[0, .01, .02. .03, .04, 
-1, -15]
.05, - f  j
IncrementalDeiay double Fixed .005 - _ - .
Num Hosts short Fixed 15 ” !" - -
NumReps short Fixed 12 " ” - . j
ProbMisbehavior double Fixed •5 - ... - -
ServerStartRate double Fixed 2 ‘ - ........  ............
ServiceRate double Fixed 19
TIT'
~ - :
APPENDIX A.4
SAN Modeling of the Multicast Routing Decentralized Management
(MRDM) Architecture
M odel: Firewall
Place Names ! Initial Markings
EscapedMultiPhase j o
EscapedS inglePhase 0
GoodReqs 0
NumActive Num Servers
Offline 0
PhasesNeeded 0
Timed Activity: FilterRequests
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters
Rate
F i l t e r R a t e * ( N u m A c t i v e  
>M ar k () )  : 0)
s
- > M a r k ( ) ? ( N u m S e r v e r s * l . O/NumAct ive-
Activation Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1
case 1
P r o b F i 1t e r i n g * P r o b S i n g l e P h a s e
Case Distributions case 2P r o b F i l t e r i n g  * P r o b M u l t i P h a s e  
case 3
1 - ( P r o b S i n g l e P h a s e  + P r o b M u l t i P h a s e )
Input Gate: Filter
Predicate
(E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - 
MaxGwQLen
&& O f f l i n e - > M a r k ()==
>M ark() + GoodR eqs- >M ark () )  < 
0
Function
MPAttackOutput Gate:
s h o r t  x  = M a x P h a s e s > 2 ? ( ( s h o r t ) ( r a n d ( ) % ( M a x P h a s e s - 2 ) ) + 2 ) : 2 ;
/ / u n c o m m e n t  t h i s
/ / s h o r t  x = l ; / / c o m m e n t  t h i s
i f (E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - >M ark( ) ==0) {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () = x ;
}
e l s e  {
/ /  p r o b  o f  c h o o s i n g  num p h a s e s  i n v e r s e l y  p r o p  t o  #
Function p h a s e s
}
s h o r t  y  = x  + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) ;  
s h o r t  z = 1 + ( r a n d ( ) % ( y - 1 ) ) ;  / / u n c o m m e n t  t h i s  
/ / s h o r t  z = l ;  / /  comment t h i s  
i f ( z  > x) {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () = x ;
}
P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () = 1 + ( s h o r t ) ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () 
* f r a c P h a s e s ) ;
Model: Server
Place Names
Corruption
EscapedMultiPhase
EscapedSinglePhase
GoodReqs
N um A ctive
NumCorrupt
Offline
PhasesNeeded
detected
Timed Activity:
Exponential 
Distribution 
Parameters 
Activation Predicate 
Reactivation Predicate
Case Distributions
Timed Activity: 
Exponential 
Distribution 
Parameters 
Activation Predicate 
Reactivation Predicate
Initial Markings
0 
0 
0 
0
Num Servers 
0 
0 
0 
0
Detection
Rate
D e t e c t i o n R a t e  
case 1
( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) / M a x P h a s e s  
case 2
1 - ( ( P r o b D e t e c t i o n * C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k ( ) ) /M a x P h a s e s )
(none)
(none)
Rate
R e p a i r R a t e
Repair
(none)
(none)
--- — — .. '• 1
Timed Activity: ServeReq
Exponential Rate
Distribution
Parameters S e r v i c e R a t e
Activation |
Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1 _ .. .
Case
Distributions
case 1
( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () 
+ E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s - > M ar k () )  
case 2
( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) * (NumAct ive-
>Mark( ) ? ( 1 . 0 / N u m A c t i v e - >Mark() )  : 0 ) ) / (  E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - 
>Mark() + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - >M ark() + G oodR eqs - >M ark () )
case 3
( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) * ( 1 - (NumAct ive-
>Mark( ) ? ( 1 . 0 / N u m A c t i v e - >M ar k () )  : 0 ) ) ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e -  
>Mark() + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + GoodR eqs- >M ark () )  
case 4
(G ood Reqs- >M ark( ) * 1 . 0 ) / ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () +
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s -> M ark () )
Timed Activity: agreement
Exponential
Distribution
Parameters 1 . 0 / ( A g r e e m e n t D e l a y + I n c r e m e n t a l D e l a y * ( (N um A ct iv e -> M ar k ( ) - 
1 ) 1 3 ) )
Activation
Predicate 1
Reactivation
Predicate 1
Input Gate: Detect
Predicate C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () > 0 && O f f l i n e - > M a r k ( ) ==0 && 
d e t e c t e d - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function •
Input Gate: RepairServer
Predicate O f f l i n e - > M a r k ()
Function Of f  l i n e  - >Mark 0 = 0 ;  
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ( )++;
Input Gate: Service
Predicate ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () + E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () + G o o d R eq s -> M ark ()) > 0 
&& O f f l i n e - > M a r k ( ) ==0
Function 1/
Input Gate: byzantine
Predicate
i
(3 * N u m C o r r u p t - > M ar k () < N u m A c t iv e - > M ark ()) && d e t e c t e d -  
>M ark () > 0
Function d e t e c t e d - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;
Output Gate: ServeGoodReq
Function i f ( G o o d R e q s - > M a r k ()) {Go odReq s - >M ark ( ) - -  ;
}
Output Gate: ServeMultiPhaseFail
Function
i f ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ()) {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) - - ; 
i f ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () = = 0) {
i f  ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M a r k () < MaxPhases)  { 
C o r r u p t i o n -  >Mark 0 = 0 ;
}
P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () = 0;
}
}
Output Gate: ServelMultiPhaseSucc
Function
i f ( E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k () )  {
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) - -  ; 
s h o r t  f l a g = 0 ;
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - >M ark () < P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () )  { 
C o r r u p t i o n - >M ark ()++ ;  
f l a g = l ;
}
i f  ( C o r r u p t i o n - > M ar k () = = P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () )
{
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) =0 ; 
P h a s e s N e e d e d - > M a r k () = 0;
C o r r u p t i o n - >M ar k () = M a x P h a s e s ;  
i f  ( f l a g )  N u m C o r r u p t - > M a r k () + + ;
}
}
Output Gate: ServeSinglePhase
Function
i f ( E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k () )  {
E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k ( ) - - ;  
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - >M ar k () < M axPhas es)  {
C o r r u p t i o n - >M ark () = M ax P h as e s ;  
N u m C o r r u p t - > M a r k () + + ;
) }
Output Gate: TakeOffline
Function
E s c a p e d S i n g l e P h a s e - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;  
i n t  f l a g = 0 ;
E s c a p e d M u l t i P h a s e - > M a r k  0 = 0 ;
GoodReqs  - >Mark 0 = 0 ;
Of f  l i n e - > M a r k  0 = 1 ;
N u m A c t i v e - > M a r k ( ) - -  ;
i f ( C o r r u p t i o n - >Mark( ) ==MaxPhases)  f l a g = l ;
C o r r u p t i o n - >Mark 0 = 0 ;
i f  ( f l a g  ==1) N u m C o r r u p t - >M ark ( ) - - ;
/ / i f  ( C o r r u p t i o n - >M ark( ) ==MaxPhases)  N u m C o r r u p t - > M a r k ( ) -  
" /
/ / C o r r u p t i o n  - >Mark 0 = 0 ; -
Model: M RDM
Rep Node Reps Shared State Variables
Rep 1 NumServers NumActive
NumCorrupt
Join Node: Joinl :
State Variable Name Submodel Variables
EscapedMultiPhase F irewal l->EscapedMultiPhase
Server->EscapedMultiPhase
EscapedSinglePhase F ire wall->EscapedS inglePhase
Server->EscapedSinglePhase
GoodReqs Firewall->GoodReqs
Server->GoodReqs
NumActive F irewall->N um Active
Server->NumActive
NumCorrupt Server->NumCorrupt
Offline
Firewall->Offline
Server->Offline
PhasesNeeded Firewall->PhasesNeeded
Server->PhasesNeeded
Performance Variable Model: MRDM PV
, , , T _ . Child Model Name MRDM Top Level Model Information
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable: throughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions (Reward is over all Available Models)
return 1;
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Type
Options
Simulator Statistics
Parameters
Confidence
Time Averaged interval of Time 
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable: arrivalrate
Affecting Models Firewall
Firewal 1 ->Fi IterRequests case 1 
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return 1;
Firewall->FilterRequests_case2 
Impulse Functions (Reward is over a ll Available Models)
return {1+(MaxPhases/2.0));
Firewall->FilterRequests_case3 
(Reward is over a ll Availab le Models)
return 1;
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time ■
Estimate Mean 1- .. . 1
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative i
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0.
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable: fracCorruptServers
Affecting Models Server
Impulse
Functions
(Reward is over a ll Available Models)
Reward Function if (Server->NumActive->Mark() > 0)
return Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()*1.0/(Server->NumActive- 
>Mark()*NumServers);
Simulator Type Instant of Time
Statistics
Options
Parameters
Confidence
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Start Time
Confidence Level
Confidence Interval
Performance Variable : StrongUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if(Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()>0 ¡| Server->NumActive- 
return 1.0/NumServers;
>Mark()==0)
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilitiesj Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
_ _  ..--1
Performance Variable : WeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics
if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()) 
return 1.O/NumServers;
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
30.0
0.95
0.1
Performance Variable : numCorrupt
Affecting Models Server 
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
return (Server->Corruption->Mark()>=MaxPhases);
Type Instant of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 30.0
Confidence
1
Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable : goodthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
Server->ServeReq_case4
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() < MaxPhases) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Simulator Statistics
Estimate Mean
Options
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
:
Performance Variable : badthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions <Rmard ismer a!l Avai,ahle
if (Server-¡»Corruption->Mark () == MaxPhases) 
return 1;
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics
Type Time Averaged Interval of Time
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate 
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Start Time 0.0
Stop Time 30.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.1
Performance Variable Model: MRDM PV SS
Top Level Model Information Child Model Name MRDM
Model Type Rep/Join
Performance Variable : SSfracCorruptServers
Affecting Models Server
Impulse
Functions
Reward Function
Simulator
Statistics
(Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->NumActive->Mark() > 0)
return Server->NumCorrupt->Mark()*1.0/(Server->NumActive- 
>Mark()*NumServers);
Type
Options
Steady State 
Estimate Mean 
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate 
Estimate out of Range Probabilities 
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters
!
Initial Transient
Batch Size
Confidence Confidence Level
Confidence Interval
5.0
1000.0
0.95
0.01
Performance Variable : SSStrongUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function if(Server-■>NumCorrupt->Mark()>0 | |  Server->NumActive->Mark()==0) 
return 1.0/NumServers;
Simulator Statistics Type Steady State
Options Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient
5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSWeakUnavailability
Affecting Models Server
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function if (Server->NumActive->Mark() == Server->NumCorrupt->Mark())
return 1.0/NumServers; __
Type Steady State
1 Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate !
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate _i
Simulator Statistics
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
i
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
.
Performance Variable : SSnumCorrupt
Affecting Models Server 
Impulse Functions
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Simulator Statistics
return (Server->Corruption->Mark()>=MaxPhases);
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSgoodthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions <Reward is over a,t Models)
if (Server-¡»Corruption->Mark () < MaxPhases) 
return 1;
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Reward Function
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Performance Variable : SSbadthroughput
Affecting Models Server
Server->ServeReq_case4
Impulse Functions (Reward is over all Available Models)
if (Server->Corruption->Mark() == MaxPhases) 
return 1;
Reward Function
(Reward is over all Available Models)
Type Steady State
Estimate Mean
Include Lower Bound on Interval Estimate
Options Include Upper Bound on Interval Estimate
Simulator Statistics Estimate out of Range Probabilities
Confidence Level is Relative
Parameters Initial Transient 5.0
Batch Size 1000.0
Confidence Confidence Level 0.95
Confidence Interval 0.01
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Detection in Project MRDM :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type Function n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 -
Max Phases short Fixed 5
Num Servers short Fixed 12 -
ProbDetection double Manual
[0. .1, .2, .3, .4, .6, .8. 
1]
-
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed 0.001
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 -
RepairRate double Fixed .06
'' ' j ;
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 _
fracPhases double Fixed .6 -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study MultiPhase in Project MRDM :
Variable Type “ an ge  Type Range
T . Increment Increment __Type
t j j 
Function n
...............
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 _ -
DetectionRate double Fixed i - i- .-  4 j
FilterRate double Fixed 10 ” j. .......... - j
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 - - -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 - r
} }
MaxPhases short Fixed 5 ” ■ :  - j
Num Servers short Fixed 12 - .
ProbDetection double Fixed 0.5 > -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4 .
... - -j—j
ProbMultiPhase double Incremental [0 .0 ,0 .009000000000000001 ] .001 Additive - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed 0
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study NumServers in Project MRDM :
Variable Type Range Type Range T , Increment Increment ^Type Function n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 - - - -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - - - -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 - - - -
Incrementai Delay double Fixed .01 - - - -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 - - - -
Max Phases short Fixed 5 - - - -
NumServers short Incremental [4,13] 3 Additive -
ProbDetection double Fixed 0.5 - - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4 - - - -
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed 0.001 - - - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 _ - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 _ L - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study M R D M S t u d y in Project M R D M  :
Variable
1
Type Range Type Range
j
Increment IncrementType Function n1 i
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 - . -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 r L ..........
FilterRate double Fixed 10 ' -
!_ i 1 *
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 .ì - "
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 * - _ -
MaxPhases short Fixed 5 r - -
NumServers short Fixed 12 - L i
ProbDetection double Fixed 0.5 - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4 - - - _
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed 0.001 - - -
ProbSinglePhase double Fixed .002 - - -
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - - - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study M RD M StudySS  in Project MRDM:
Variable Type Range Type Range T , in crem en t  _Increment ^ Function n Type
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 -
FilterRate double Fixed 10 -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 -
MaxPhases short Fixed 5 -
Num Servers short Fixed 12 -
ProbDetection double Fixed .5 -
ProbFiltering double Fixed •4 -
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed .001 -
ProbSingiePhase double Fixed .002 '
RepairRate double Fixed .06 .
ServiceRate double Fixed 16
fracPhases double Fixed .6 -
;
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study Repair in Project MRDM :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type Function n
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 - - -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - _ "
FilterRate double Fixed 10 -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 - -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10
MaxPhases short Fixed 5 - - ‘
NumServers short Fixed 12 “
ProbDetection double Fixed 0.5 - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4 - - -
ProbMultiPhase double Fixed 0.001 - - -
ProbSingiePhase double Fixed .002 - - -
RepairRate double Manual
[0. .01, .02. .03. .04, .05, 
-1, -15]
- - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - - -
fracPhases double Fixed .6 - - -
Range Study Variable Assignments for Study SinglePhase in Project MRDM :
Variable Type RangeType Range Increment
Increment
Type Function
AgreementDelay double Fixed .15 - - -
DetectionRate double Fixed 1 - - -
FiiterRate double Fixed 10 - - -
IncrementalDelay double Fixed .01 - - -
MaxGwQLen short Fixed 10 - - -
Max Phases short Fixed 5 - - -
Num Servers short Fixed 12 - - -
ProbDetection double Fixed 0.5 - - -
ProbFiltering double Fixed 0.4 - - -
ProbMulti Phase double Fixed 0 - - -
ProbSinglePhase double Incremental [0 .0 ,0 .009000000000000001 ] .001 Additive
RepairRate double Fixed .06 - - -
ServiceRate double Fixed 16 - -
frac Phases double Fixed .6 -
